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"If You Ain't Got The Do, Re, Mi":
The Commerce Clause and
State Residence Restrictions on Welfare
Stephen Loffredot
'Cross the desert sands they rode,
Gettin' out of that old dust bowl,
Thinkin' they're goin' to a sugar bowl,
But here is what they find:
The police at the port of entry say,
"You're number fourteen thousand for today;
But if you ain't got the do, re, mi, folks,
If you ain't got the do, re, mi,
You better go back to beautiful Texas,
Oklahoma, Kansas, Georgia, Tennessee.
California is the Garden of Eden,
A paradise to live in or to see,
But believe it or not, you won't find it so hot,
If you ain't got the do, re, mi."
-Woody Guthrie1
Few problems are as national in character as the persistence of widespread
poverty in the United States.2 And few problems so consistently provoke
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1. Woody Guthrie, Do, Re, Mi (1937). Guthrie's song describes the plight of the "Okies" and other
victims of the Depression-era economic collapse, who suffered under state policies that sought to bar in-
migration by poor people from other parts of the country. The California exclusion policy immortalized
by Guthrie, and by John Steinbeck in THE GRAPES OF WRATH (1939), was struck down as violative of
the Commerce Clause in Edwards v. Califbrnia, 314 U.S. 160 (1941), discussed infm notes 64-68, 173-90
and accompanying text.
2. The idea that poverty is a national problem in need of a federal solution is of relatively recent
vintage. Cf GERTRUDE HIMMELFARB, THE IDEA OF POVERTY: ENGLAND IN THE EARLY INDUSTRIAL AGE
(1985) (tracing the development of the "idea of poverty" in the "moral imagination" of eighteenth-century
England). It was not until the Great Depression that the federal government acknowledged the need for
a federal approach to the problem of poverty. See FRANCES F. PIVEN & RICHARD CLOwARD, REGULATING
THE POOR: THE FUNCTIONS OF PUBLIC WELFARE 45-79 (1971); EDwARD A. WILLIAMS, FEDERAL AID
FOR RELIEF 7-15 (1939) (describing local patterns of relief in the period up to 1929). Since that time,
however, the status of poverty as a national concern has been routinely recognized by policymakers,
academics and analysts. See, e.g., HELEN I. CLARKE, SOCIAL LEGISLATION 480-86 (1940) (noting national
character of poverty, relief programs, and migration of poor people); ROBERT S. McELVAINE, THE GREAT
DEPRESSION 344-349 (1984) (drawing parallels between national character of Great Depression and
economic downturns of the 1980s); KEVIN PHILLIPS, THE POLITICS OF RICH AND POOR (1990) (tracing
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parochial and isolationist responses from states and localities.3 The economic
downturn of the late 1980s and early 1990s provides a case in point. In 1992,
the number of Americans living below the official poverty line climbed to its
highest point since 1964, the year that the nation declared its "war on
poverty." 4 Wrenching dislocations in the occupational structure and the conse-
quent contraction of reasonable employment opportunities have compelled
record numbers of individuals and families to turn to government for the basic
necessities of life.' In the face of this national tragedy, an increasing number
of states are openly attempting to exclude poor people from their borders by
adopting "protectionist" social-welfare policies.6
The states' principal exclusionary strategy has been to revive "durational
residence" restrictions on public benefit eligibility. These restrictions typically
take one of two forms: an outright ban on newcomers from receiving benefits
history of national economic cycles and distribution of wealth in the United States). Starting in the 1930s,
the federal government developed a broad spectrum of anti-poverty programs that operate nationally and
receive federal funding. See STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 102D CONG., 1ST SESS.,
OVERVIEW OF ENTITLEMENT PROGRAMS (Comm. Print 1991) [hereinafter GREEN BOOK] (describing and
presenting data on selected federal anti-poverty programs in the areas of health, income support, disability
benefits, and unemployment insurance).
3. Commentators have noted that the persistence of narrow, localist responses to poverty has made
it extraordinarily difficult to formulate or implement a coherent approach to the problem at the national
level. See, e.g., BEN B. SELIGMAN, PERMANENT POVERTY: AN AMERICAN SYNDROME 199-218; see also
Paul Taylor, Carrots and Sticks of Welfare Reform, Author of Landmark Federal Bill Hears Why States
Are Going Their Own Way, WASH. POST, Feb. 4, 1992, at A13 (discussing state requests for "waivers"
of uniform federal guidelines for operating Aid to Families With Dependent Children program); State and
Local Officials Try to Map Their Own Paths Out of the Recession, WALL ST. J., Jan. 29, 1992, at A2
("While waiting for a concerted federal plan to prime the economic pump, many state and local govern-
ments have decided that the job of ending the recession has been left to them."). "Localist" in this sense
is to be distinguished from authentic, community-based responses to poverty that have as their goal the
empowerment and autonomy of the economically dispossessed. See FRANCES F. PIVEN & RICHARD A.
CLOWARD, POOR PEOPLES' MOVEMENTS: WHY THEY SUCCEED, How THEY FAIL (1977).
4. See Robert Pear, Ranks of the Poor Reach 35.7 Million, the Most Since '64, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
4, 1992, at Al; see also JOHN C. DONOVAN, THE POLITICS OF POVERTY 17-38 (1967) (describing historical
background to "war on poverty"); SELIGMAN, supra note 3, at 161-78.
5. See, e.g., CENTER ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, WELFARE ROLLS RISING DUE TO THE
RECESSION (Feb. 21, 1992) (citing CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, A PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS OF
GROWING CASELOADS IN AFDC (Dec. 1991) (on file with author)); John E. Schwartz & Thomas J. Volgy,
Above the Poverty Line-But Poor, NATION, Feb. 15, 1993, at 191-92 (noting that in 1989 fully one-sixth
of all full-time, year-round jobs in the United States "paid less than it took to lift even a family of three
effectively out of poverty").
6. See infta notes 110-27 and accompanying text. In addition, many states have recently adopted
regressive or punitive welfare policies that affect poor people who are already within the state's borders.
At least seven states have indiscriminately cut assistance levels to amounts far below the officially
recognized minimum for bare subsistence. See CENTER ON SOCIAL WELFARE POLICY & LAW, Pm. No.
167 (rev.), No RELIEF FOR THE POOR: 1992 STATE CUTBACKS IN AFDC, GA AND EAF, PART I (Sept.
14, 1992) [hereinafter No RELIEF]. Other states have imposed demeaning and dehumanizing administrative
conditions on relief, like the fingerprinting requirement adopted in New York. N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW
§ 139-a(3) (Consol. 1992). Still others have threatened to reduce or terminate subsistence payments to
young children in order to coerce "welfare mothers" to conform to legislated behavioral norms. See No
RELIEF, supra; Wayne King, Florio Signs an Overhaul of Welfare, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 1992, at B1
(describing New Jersey plan to deny additional payments to women who bear children while receiving
AFDC payments); Paul Taylor, Little to Soften Squeeze of Recession and State Cuts on the Poor, WASH.
POST, Jan. 30, 1992, at AIO (describing state cuts in welfare programs).
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until they have lived in the state for a fixed period; or a reduction in the level
of benefits that a newcomer can receive (often capped at the lower rate of the
state from which the applicant migrated).7 The assumption behind this strategy
is that "liberal" welfare policies act as a magnet to attract indigents into higher
benefit states.' The undesired "pull-factor" can be mitigated, the theory goes,
by restricting the rights of new residents to receive public benefits. Proponents
of durational residence restrictions have unabashedly declared their purpose
to be the prevention of in-migration by economically deprived citizens from
other states.9 Consistent with this goal, some of the states that currently
impose durational residence requirements also offer newcomers a bus ticket
back home to avoid paying any benefits.' 0
Durational residence restrictions are constitutionally troubling for many
reasons. They discriminate against disenfranchised nonresidents who have no
participatory voice in the laws that affect them. They balkanize the states by
seeking to divert the costs of economic downturn to other parts of the country.
They arbitrarily deny one class of poor people subsistence benefits that may
be necessary for survival. And they enforce a caste system under which an
individual's economic status becomes the measure of her citizenship.
Twenty years ago, the Supreme Court held that state durational residence
restrictions on welfare violated the equal protection guarantees of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution. " The resurgence of such restric-
tions, in slightly altered incarnations, has reopened the constitutional debate,
and several courts have entered the fray. 2 For the most part, poor peoples'
advocates have continued to press equal protection claims on the theory that
length-of-residence requirements unfairly burden the fundamental right to travel
7. See infra notes 110-13 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 128-133 and accompanying text. But cf Mitchell v. Steffen, 487 N.W.2d 896, 900
(Minn. Ct. App. 1992) (appeal pending) (noting conclusion of reports by Minnesota Legislative Auditor
and Minnesota Department of Human Services that "net effect" of welfare levels on migration "is
negligible"); Paul R. Voss, A Demographic Portrait of Wisconsin's People, in STATE POLICY CHOICES:
THE WISCONSIN EXPERIENCE (Sheldon H. Danziger & John F. Witte eds., 1988) (discussing the de minimis
effect of Wisconsin's welfare payment levels on the movement of poor people into that state); James W.
Wahner & Jerome R. Stepaniak, Welfare In-Migration in Wisconsin: A Four County Report, Wis. POL'Y
RES. INST. REP., Dec. 1988, at 1 (concluding that Wisconsin's welfare policies have a measurable, though
insignificant, impact on the migration of poor people to the state).
9. See infi notes 128-33 and accompanying text.
10. See Office of Procedures, Income Support Programs, Limited Home Relieffor New Residents, I.S.
CHANGES, July 1992, at 16-17 [Limited Home Relief].
11. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634-38 (1969); see also infra notes 69-93 and accompanying
text.
12. E.g., Green v. Anderson, 811 F. Supp. 516, 523 (E.D. Cal. 1993) (granting preliminary injunction
against enforcement of California statute that denies full AFDC benefits during first 12 months of state
residence); Jones v. Milwaukee County, 485 N.W.2d 21, 28 (Wis. 1992) (upholding 60-day length-of-
residence requirement for Wisconsin general relief program); Mitchell, 487 N.W.2d at 907 (invalidating
Minnesota statute providing only reduced general assistance benefits to persons with less than six-month
residence in state); Eddleman v. Center Township, 723 F. Supp. 85, 92 (S.D. Ind. 1989) (invalidating one-
year county and three-year state residence requirement for local assistance).
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and can be justified only by a compelling state interest." An alternative
argument contends that such restrictions violate the Privileges and Immunities
clause of Article IV, section 2, because they create a two-tiered welfare system
in which newcomers are treated as second-class citizens.14 Success on these
claims has been mixed,"5 and the litigation is fraught with uncertainty given
the conservative activism of the Rehnquist Court."'
This Article proposes an additional framework for analysis. It contends that
durational residence restrictions on welfare violate the Commerce Clause17
because they are, in essence, protectionist measures that seek to inhibit inter-
state migration by economically disadvantaged Americans. Courts and com-
mentators have long accepted that the force of the Commerce Clause in its
negative state derives, at least in part, from a political theory of union that
subordinates provincial interest to national concern.' A core function of the
clause is to provide a bulwark against invidious treatment of outsiders, 9 and
to serve a structural role in the creation of national solidarity.2" As Justice
Cardozo declared more than a half-century ago, "the Constitution . . . was
framed up on the theory that the peoples of the several states must sink or
swim together . ".. 21 State attempts to insulate themselves from national
economic problems by actively discouraging the entry of poor Americans from
other parts of the country tear at the fabric of this fundamental constitutional
ideal.
Reliance on the Commerce Clause to safeguard the interests of poor people
may seem incompatible with broader notions of human dignity and individual
13. See cases cited supra note 12.
14. See Mitchell v. Steffen, 487 N.W.2d 896, 899, 905 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992) (appeal pending). See
generally John Harrison, Reconstructing the Privilegesand Immunities Clause, 101 YALE L.J. 1385 (1992);
Gary J. Simon, Discrimination Against Nonresidents and the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article
IV, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 379 (1979).
15. See cases cited supra note 12.
16. There is reason to believe that the doctrine on which these cases rely may be vulnerable. Members
of the Rehnquist Court generally share the theoretical bent of commentators who severely criticized the
Warren Court's invalidation of durational residence requirements in Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618
(1969). See, e.g., Raoul Berger, Residence Requirementsfor Welfare and Voting: A Post Mortem, 42 OHIO
ST. L.J. 853 (1981); Ralph K. Winter, Jr., Poverty, Economic Equality and the Equal Protection Clause,
1972 Sup. CT. REV. 41. Moreover, for the past twenty years, the Court has accorded extreme deference
to social welfare classifications that adversely affect the poor, and no challenge to such legislation has
succeeded since 1973. See generally Peter B. Edelman, The Next Century of Our Constitution: Rethinking
our Duty to the Poor, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 1 (1987). Emboldened by the court's poverty jurisprudence, state
lawmakers have been willing to adopt legislation understood to violate Shapiro, see Jones v. Milwaukee
County, 485 N.W.2d 21, 29 n. 1 (statement by sponsor of Wisconsin durational residence requirement that
Shapiro "was runaway judicial lawmaking" that "arguably violates the Constitution"), and at least one state
court has declined to faithfully apply the Shapiro holding, id. at 24-30.
17. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
18. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 415 (2d ed. 1988).
19. See, e.g., Julian N. Eule, Laying the Dormant Commerce Clause to Rest, 91 YALE L.J. 425
(1982).
20. See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, Rethinking the Dormant Commerce Clause, 1979 Wis. L. REV. 125.
21. Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 523 (1935).
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liberty.' Resort to the language of the Commerce Clause in this context might
even be considered a form of "spirit-murder" that commodifies the individual
and reduces her to the legal status of chattel.' On this view, relegating the
legal protection of the poor to the Commerce Clause reinforces the "otherness"
of poor people and their historic exclusion from the broader community of
rights.24 As Justice Douglas aptly put it, "the right of persons to move freely
from State to State [should] occup[y] a more protected position in our constitu-
tional system than does the movement of cattle, fruit, steel and coal across
state lines.'
At least on the surface, this objection carries considerable moral appeal.26
But it assumes that alternative doctrines will invariably protect the poor against
the immediate and irreparable physical harms that exclusionary welfare policies
inflict.27 History shows, however, that in applying the Fourteenth Amendment
to poor people's claims, the Supreme Court has been all too willing to tolerate
22. See, e.g., PAUL R. BENSON, JR., THE SUPREME COURT AND THE COMMERCE CLAUSE, 1937-1970
191 (1970) (stating that "[alt first glance it may seem incongruous to associate the commerce clause with
the current struggle [by African Americans during the civil rights movement] fbr human dignity and
individual rights").
23. Cf PATRICIA WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTs: THE DIARY OF A LAW PROFESSOR
73 (1991) (setting forth the concept of racism as "spirit-murder"); Robin West, Murdering the Spirit:
Racism, Rights and Commerce, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1771, 1793 (1992) (reviewing Williams' concept of
"spirit-murder"). At the same time, some conservatives have criticized any analysis of the commerce clause
that regards it as a source of individual rights. See, e.g., Dennis v. Higgins, II1 S. Ct. 865, 874 (1991)
(Kennedy, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Commerce Clause "assigned prerogatives to the general
government, not personal rights"); cf Jesse Choper, The Scope of the National Power Vis-a-Vis the States:
The Dispensability of Judicial Review, 86 YALE L.J. 1552, 1587 n. 194 (1977) (arguing that an individual
who "attack[s] state and local laws [as violative of the Commerce Clause] is asserting the interest of the
central government, not his own constitutionally secured liberties"). See generally Stephen K. Schutte,
Doctrinal Foundations of Section 1983 and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 77 IowA L. REV. 1249 (1992)
(critiquing "right-conferring capacity" of Dormant Commerce Clause).
24. See KENNETH KARST, BELONGING TO AMERICA: EQUAL CrTIZENSHIP AND THE CONSTITUTION
125-26 (1991) (arguing that perception of non-working poor people as "the Other" drives public policies
aimed at "separating the poor-especially the female and minority poor-from the rest of us"); cf Martha
Minow, Interpreting Rights: An Essay for Robert Cover, 96 YALE L.J. 1860, 1880 (1987) (contending that
"an interpretive conception of rights is a way to ... promote change by reliance on inherited traditions,"
but noting that "[siome people may feel so shut out that the appeal to a communal commitment to rights
makes no sense to them").
25. Edwards v. Califbrnia, 314 U.S. 160, 177 (1941) (Douglas, J., concurring); see id. at 182
(Jackson, J., concurring) ("[Tihe migrations of a human being . . . do not fit easily into my notions as
to what is commerce. To hold that the measure of his rights is the Commerce Clause is likely to result
eventually in either distorting the commercial law or in denaturing human rights."); see also Heart of
Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 279 (1965) (Douglas, J., concurring) (criticizing a constitu-
tional analysis that would accord "human rights... [no more of a] protected position in our constitutional
system than ... the movement of cattle, fruit, steel and coal across state lines").
26. The Equal Protection Clause and the Article IV Privileges and Immunities Clause admittedly
present by far the more felicitous constitutional frameworks. See, e.g., Eule, supra note 19, at 446-55;
Brian H. Wildenthal, State Parochialism, the Right to Travel, and the Privileges and Immunities Clause
of Article IV, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1557 (1989); see also Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 71-81 (1982)
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (setting forth an Article IV privileges and immunities analysis for invalidating
Alaska scheme that distributed state oil revenues based upon citizens' length of state residence).
27. But see Stephen Loffredo, Poverty, Democracy and Constitutional Law, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1277
(1993) (analyzing the Court's current poverty jurisprudence).
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arbitrary and even punitive classifications that deny "the most basic economic
needs of impoverished human beings."2 Moreover, while the Court has
steadfastly employed the Equal Protection Clause to strike down even mild
forms of state discrimination against newcomers, 9 there is reason to believe
that the Rehnquist Court would regard a new welfare residence case as an
opportunity to retreat from the holding and principles set forth in Shapiro v.
Thompson.3° Whatever principled doubts may linger about resort to the
Commerce Clause in an area touching on human rights, the gravity of the
stakes here-the difference between food and hunger, shelter and
homelessness-counsels heed to the old adage, "grub first, then ethics."31
This is not to concede that one sacrifices "ethics" by turning to the
Commerce Clause to protect poor people. It sells the Commerce Clause short
to regard its concern as confined to the narrow world of trade in commodi-
ties.32 In this century alone, the Commerce Clause "has played a major
role ... in the efforts of the federal government to secure 'equal justice under
law' for American minority groups. "" Regulation of commerce may be the
28. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1971); see, e.g., Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587
(1987); Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221 (1980); Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972); James
v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1970); see also Loffredo, supra note 27.
29. See, e.g., Attorney Gen. of N.Y. v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898 (1986) (invalidating civil service
rule that provided preference only for those resident veterans who had entered the military service while
living in New York); Zobel, 457 U.S. 55 (invalidating as violation of equal protection Alaska program
that distributed state's mineral earnings to citizens in amounts proportionate to length of individual's state
residence). For a description and critique of the Court's protectiveness of new state residents, see, e.g.,
Katheryn D. Katz, More Equal Than Others: The Burger Court and the Newly Arrived State Resident, 19
N.M. L. REV. 329 (1989).
30. The Wisconsin Supreme Court has already pursued this path, rejecting an equal protection
challenge to the new 60-day residence requirement for that state's general assistance program. Jones v.
Milwaukee County, 485 N.W.2d 21 (Wis. 1992). The state court upheld the residence requirement by
applying an "undue burden" balancing approach nearly identical to the analysis that Justice Harlan
proposed, but the majority rejected, in Shapiro. Compare Jones, 485 N.W.2d at 24-28 (holding that
Wisconsin 60-day residence requirement does not penalize an individual's right to travel) with Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 671-77 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (concluding that government interests
served by residence requirements outweigh burden imposed on the right to travel). Although the Wisconsin
decision marks a sharp departure from Shapiro, it resonates with the judicial method of the Rehnquist Court
and illustrates the extent to which Shapiro may be vulnerable to dismemberment at the federal level. See,
e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992) (applying "undue burden" test to legislation
impinging upon women's fundamental right to make reproductive choices); Employment Div. v. Smith,
110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990) (finding no constitutional infirmity in generally applicable statutes that "incidentally
burden" the First Amendment right to the free exercise of religion).
31. W.H. AUDEN & Louis KRONENBERGER, THE VIKING BOOK OF APHORIsMS 368 (1981) (quoting
BERTOLT BRECHT, THE THREEPENNY OPERA act 2, finale).
32. See, e.g., Edwards v. Califbrnia, 314 U.S. 160, 181-86 (1941) (Jackson, J., concurring). Justice
Jackson opposed the use of the Commerce Clause to advance civil rights in part because he regarded the
doctrine as nothing more than i species of "commercial law." Id. Constitutional provisions, though, do
not generally lend themselves to this type of compartmentalization. For instance, the fact that the Equal
Protection Clause has been successfully employed on behalf of business interests to invalidate state taxation
schemes in no way diminishes its moral or legal force as a guarantor of human dignity. Similarly, one
should look beyond the types of cases in which the Commerce Clause has most typically provided the
ground for decision to the underlying values that the doctrine is intended to promote.
33. BENSON, supra note 22, at 191.
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clause's central mechanism, but its force and purpose lay in its structuring of
governmental authority to assure certain ends; its underlying values and
ultimate aims are no less weighty than national union, community, and demo-
cratic governance, all of which have the capacity to secure and advance human
liberty.
Finally, the history of the Commerce Clause confirms its generative
potential to protect individual freedom. In the years leading up to the Civil
War, the Commerce Clause offered a potential constitutional basis for the
federal government to remove from the states the important power to regulate
slavery.34 At the height of the Great Depression, the Commerce Clause
prevented wealthier states from shutting their gates against poor migrant
families looking for a better life." And during the Civil Rights Movement
of the 1960s, the Commerce Clause provided the constitutional basis for
federal legislation against local practices that denied African-Americans their
rightful place in the American community.36 Some may argue that the avail-
ability of a Commerce Clause theory enabled the Court to avoid more sweep-
ing and stable constitutional rulings in support of individual rights. Whatever
force that argument may have once had, the doctrinal genie long ago escaped
its bottle: for better or for worse, the Commerce Clause has become an
established basis for the protection of individuals and, in this era of constitu-
tional retrenchment, it is one that may be decisive for the poor.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I examines the historical theme
of localism in American welfare policy and locates residence restrictions within
the now-discredited poor law tradition of settlement and removal. It describes
earlier efforts by states to fence out the poor, and analyzes the Court's
response to those practices. Part II reviews current state proposals to restrict
the welfare benefits that newcomers may receive. It examines the official
policies and assumptions underlying these efforts and offers an alternative
explanation for the re-emergence of state laws designed to inhibit in-migration
by poor people. Part III assesses the constitutionality of state durational
residence restrictions under settled Commerce Clause doctrine. It measures the
legislation both against the principles set forth in Edwards v. California7 and
under the standard Commerce Clause analysis currently employed by the
Court. This Part concludes that the current crop of durational residence
34. See, e.g., FELIX FRANKFURTER, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE UNDER MARSHALL, TANEY AND WAITE
67 (1937) (discussing Justice Taney's narrow reading of the Commerce Clause in Groves v. Slaughter,
15 Pet. 449 (1841), which concerned a state's right to prohibit the importation of slaves for sale); see also
The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283 (1849) (holding that interstate commerce includes the
movement of human beings).
35. See Edwards, 314 U.S. 160 (invalidating under Commerce Clause a California statute that
criminalized transportation of an indigent person into state).
36. See, e.g., Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964) (upholding enforcement of Civil Rights
Act of 1964 against local restaurant on basis of Commerce Clause).
37. Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941).
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restrictions on welfare plainly violate the Commerce Clause on either analysis.
Part IV examines the competing theories and values underlying the Commerce
Clause, and demonstrates that state efforts to exclude the poor through
economic barriers or discriminatory welfare restrictions are inconsistent with
each of them. The Article concludes by suggesting that durational residence
requirements are symptomatic of more general efforts to exclude the
economically disadvantaged from a shared public life. The breakdown of
community, and of a collective sense of responsibility for our more vulnerable
members, reflects the broader stigmatization and isolation that the poor increas-
ingly experience in the United States. The Commerce Clause, it will be
argued, offers a doctrinal source that has the potential for the creation of a
more inclusive national identity and sense of national solidarity.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF STATE EFFORTS TO EXCLUDE THE POOR
The recent resurgence of durational residence restrictions on welfare
composes the latest chapter in a long history of state efforts to repel poor
people. From the founding of the Republic, states and localities have
endeavored to prevent the migration of indigents into their jurisdictions. The
Articles of Confederation generally required that the "free inhabitants of each
[state]" be accorded the same "privileges and immunities of free citizens of
the several states "-including "free ingress and regress to and from any other
state"-but pointedly excluded "paupers" and "vagabonds" from protection."8
The Constitution omitted this express discrimination against the poor39
and-together with the Fourteenth Amendment-forged a concept of national
citizenship that transcended state sovereignty. Nevertheless, local efforts to bar
entry of impecunious citizens from other states survived ratification of the
Constitution and persisted well into the twentieth century.
38. ARTIcLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1781 art. IV, reprinted in THE ANTI-FEDERALIST PAPERS 357
(Ralph Ketcham ed., 1986) ("The better to secure and perpetuate mutual friendship and intercourse among
the people of the different states in this union, the free inhabitants of each of these states, paupers,
vagabonds and fugitives from justice excepted, shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of free
citizens in the several states . . ").
39. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2 ("The Citizens in each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and
Immunities of Citizens in the several States.") Some have argued that the Constitutional Convention
intended the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV to embody the "pauper" and "vagabond"
exception to the privileges and immunities principle of the Articles of Confederation. See Edwards, 314
U.S. at 170 (argument for appellee) (citing United States v. Wheeler, 254 U.S. 281, 296 (1920)).
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A. Medieval English Antecedents
Local measures to curtail the in-migration of poor people have historically
taken three basic forms: "settlement" qualifications for public assistance;'
involuntary removal from the community of recently-arrived poor people; and
criminal penalties for facilitating the movement of indigents into the state.
These policies trace their origin to English laws of the fourteenth century
which, upon the break-up of feudalism, sought to restrain the mobility of free
laborers4 and create a "kind of substitute for the system of . . . serfdom "42
by providing that those without property could be forcibly ejected from a
locality and removed to their place of birth.43 The Elizabethan Poor Laws of
the seventeenth century carried this regime forward by denying relief to
persons without a "settlement"-an established residence of some duration
accompanied by landholding and payment of tax-and by authorizing the
involuntary return of newcomers who might require aid to the place of their
last settled residence." The settlement and removal provisions of the
Elizabethan Poor Laws emerged from the confluence of several factors: the
philosophy of local responsibility for poor relief, the ascendance of punitive
theories of relief-giving, and a political determination to regulate labor by
binding the lower classes to the land and halting the movement of dispossessed
40. Historically, settlement could be obtained only by being born in a community, by residing there
for a number of years without receiving aid, or by owning or renting a substantial piece of property. See
CLARKE, supra note 2, at 469-72 (discussing acquisition and loss of settlement). Settlement and residence
thus were not synonymous for purposes of poor relief. See State ex rel. Lillian Timo v. Juvenile Court,
246 N.W. 544, 546 (Minn. 1933) (holding that "settlement for purposes of poor relief and legal residence
ordinarily do, but need not, coincide geographically"). See generally 2 GRACE ABBOTT, THE CHILD AND
THE STATE 287-98 (1938) (collecting cases).
41. See CLARKE, supra note 2, at 399-401 (discussing Statute of Labourers, 1350, 25 Edw. 3, ch. 5
(Eng.); 34 Edw. 3, ch. 10 (1360) (Eng.)).
42. 3 JAMES F. STEPHEN, HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 204 (1883), quoted in Hicks
v. District of Columbia, 383 U.S. 252, 255 & n.3 (1966) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
43. See CLARKE, supra note 2, at 399-401 (discussing 12 Rich. 2 (1388) (Eng.)). The early English
statutes referred to wandering laborers as "sturdy vagabonds." See id. at 400. The terms "vagabond" and
.vagrant" continued to be used in English and American laws to describe the category of person that could
be excluded or removed from the jurisdiction. See, e.g., ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1781 art. IV
(excepting "paupers" and "vagabonds" from its "privileges and immunities" clause); cf City of N.Y. v.
Miln, 36 U.S. 102, 142-43 (1837) (upholding state legislation enacted to prevent the immigration of
"paupers, vagabonds and possibly convicts").
44. See Daniel R. Mandelker, Exclusion and Removal Legislation, 1956 Wis. L. REV. 57, 58 (citing
14 Eliz. 1, ch. 5 (1572) (Eng.) (requiring a settlement as a condition of receiving poor relief)); The Act
of Settlement, 1662, 13 & 14 Car. 2, ch. 12, § 1 (Eng.) (authorizing compulsory removal of persons
"likely to become chargeable" to their last settled residence). Those who did not own property or lease
accommodations at the rate of at least ten pounds were deemed removable as "likely to become charge-
able," so that during the Restoration Period, nine-tenths of the people of England, "all . . . who did not
belong to a small class of landowners, were liable to be expelled from any parish save their own, with
every circumstance of arrest and ignominy ... . G.M. TREVELYAN, ENGLISH SOCIAL HISTORY 278 (2d
Canadian ed. 1947).
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people from rural areas into the cities.45 The enforcement of these provisions
during the Elizabethan Period has been described as "the most extreme and
cruel form of localism that England had known previously or has known
since."'
B. Exclusionary Policies in the United States
State and local officials in this country incorporated both of the English
policies-settlement restrictions and removal authority-into their public
assistance laws. Settlement requirements generally took the form of a statute
or ordinance that denied relief to persons who had not resided in the state or
locality for a prescribed period. Such laws caused severe hardships for the
unemployed who traveled to find work during the economic depressions of the
nineteenth century.47 During the depression of 1893, for example, the surge
in numbers of migrants seeking jobs caused municipal authorities to "harde[n]
the wall between residents and strangers" and "devis[e] various strategies for
discouraging needy strangers. "48 In the twentieth century, durational residence
restrictions on public assistance have typically ranged from one to five
years,49 and have continued to take their toll on low-income families. 0
Removal statutes in the U.S. were, for the most part, indistinguishable from
their early English predecessors, though some state laws provided only for
voluntary-not compulsory-removal of poor migrants, and others required
local officials to secure consent of the migrant's home state.5" Beyond these
practices, many states and localities adopted laws that imposed civil or criminal
sanctions upon anyone who assisted a poor person from another state to enter
45. 1 GEORGE NICHOLLS, A HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH POOR LAW 153-210 (1854); see ARTHUR
BERNEY ET AL., LEGAL PROBLEMS OF THE POOR 683 (1975); Daniel R. Mandelker, The Settlement
Requirement in General Assistance, 1955 WASH. U. L.Q. 355, 357 nn.6, 9; PIVEN & CLOWARD, supra
note 2, at 130-31.
46. KARL DE SCHWEINTZ, ENGLAND'S ROAD TO SOCIAL SECURITY 39 (1943).
47. See STEPHAN THERNSTROM, POVERTY AND PROGRESS: SOCIAL MOBILITY IN A NINETEENTH
CENTURY CITy 8 (1964) (noting that during mid-nineteenth century, only one-third of all households in
surveyed areas remained in same town or city for at least ten years).
48. Katz, supra note 29, at 148.
49. See Note, Interstate Migration and Personal Liberty, 40 COLUM. L. REV. 1033 & n.7 (1940)
(citing AMERICAN PUB. WELFARE ASS'N, COMPILATION OF SETTLEMENT LAWS OF ALL STATES IN THE
UNITED STATES (1939)); CLARKE, supra note 2, at 469-70. From the 1940s through the disappearance of
durational residence requirements in the 1970s, the most common period of ineligibility was one year. See
Mandelker, supra note 45, at 367. Some jurisdictions, however, denied relief even to persons who satisfied
the length-of-residence requirement if the person had been "warned out" of the jurisdiction by local
officials, had been in need of (though not necessarily receiving) aid during the waiting period, or had not
formed the requisite intent to make the locality a permanent home. See generally id., for these and other
restrictions imposed upon the acquisition of "settlement" fbr public assistance purposes.
50. See infra notes 70-75 and accompanying text.
51. See Note, Depression Migrants and the States, 53 HARv. L. REV. 1031 (1940) (cataloguing
settlement requirements and compulsory removal legislation); CLARKE, supra note 2, at 472-77 (discussing
state removal statutes).
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the jurisdiction. 2 Exclusion laws of this sort were on the books in many
states at the turn of the twentieth century, but first achieved notoriety during
the Great Depression when enforced against the "Okies" and other internal
economic refugees fleeing the dust bowl and other depressed agricultural or
industrial areas.53 Most of these laws penalized the transportation of poor
people into the state, and not the migration itself. 4 Nonetheless, parents who
led their families across state lines could be prosecuted under state exclusion
statutes55 and, once across, the whole family could be prosecuted as
"vagrants." 56 States also condoned extra-statutory patrols that forcibly turned
back poor people at the state's borders. 7
C. The Decline of State Efforts to Exclude Poor People
State and local efforts to impede the in-migration of low-income citizens
have historically reflected a variety of underlying factors, but their common
heritage is a social theory that regards poor people as undesirable 8 and even
equates poverty with "moral pestilence. " Although there are indications that
such views continue to hold sway in some quarters," length-of-residence
restrictions and other exclusionary practices all but vanished by the mid-
52. See Note, supra note 51, at 1033.
53. A select committee of the House of Representatives was appointed to investigate the large-scale
interstate migration of poor people. The committee's chairman, Congressman John H. Tolan of California,
appeared as amicus curiae before the Supreme Court in Edwards to oppose his home state's restrictive
legislation. See Leonard Boudin, The Right to Travel, in THE RIGHTS OF AMERICANS: WHAT THEY
ARE-WHAT THEY SHOULD BE 382 (Norman Dorsen ed., 1970).
54. See, e.g., Note, supra note 49, at 1034.
55. Id.; see Brief of Petitioner at 15 & n.66, Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941) ("The
[exclusion] Statute is a convenient method of forcing the return of an entire group of migrants by arresting
and sentencing the driver of the automobile and then suspending the sentence on condition that all leave
the state.").
56. See generally Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1971) (discussing array of state
vagrancy statutes).
57. See Note, supra note 49, at 1034; see also CLARKE, supra note 2, at 477 (recounting common
state practice of "plac[ing] police at their borders to turn back those whose appearance gives indication
of poverty").
58. See JOEL F. HANDLER, REFORMING THE POOR 7-10 (1972) (describing stereotyped association
of poor people with "moral degeneracy, drunkenness, vice and corruption"); SELIGMAN, supra note 3,
at 7 (stating that "the American myths of independence, self-help, and laissez faire relegated the poor to
a purgatory of personal failure"); CHRISTOPHER G. TIEDEMAN, A TREATISE ON STATE AND FEDERAL
CONTROL OF PERSONS AND PROPERTY IN THE UNITED STATES 142 (1900) ("The vagrant has been very
appropriately described as the chrysalis of every species of criminal. A wanderer through the land, without
home ties, idle and without apparent means of support, what but criminality is to be expected from such
a person?").
59. See City of N.Y. v. Miln, 36 U.S. 102, 142-43 (1837) ("[It is] as competent and as necessary
for a state to provide precautionary measures against the moral pestilence of paupers [and] vagabonds ...
as it is to guard against the physical pestilence, which may arise from unsound and infectious articles
imported . . . ."); see also Edwards, 314 U.S. at 173-77 (rejecting California's argument that allowing
poor people to migrate into the state would create a "morals" problem).
60. See, e.g., Loffredo, supra note 27.
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1970s6 ' and did not re-emerge until the recent spate of welfare reforms. This
brief respite was animated in the main neither by enlightened social thinking
in state legislative halls 2 nor in response to the widely held belief that
governmental attempts to inhibit free movement by poor people are antithetical
to the "concepts of political democracy and personal liberty upon which this
country was founded. "63 Rather, the relaxation of state measures to deter
in-migration by poor people came about only at constitutional gunpoint, in
response to two landmark decisions of the United States Supreme Court.
1. The Demise of Exclusion and Removal: Edwards v. California
In the first of these decisions, Edwards v. California,64 the Court effec-
tively invalidated two of the three devices that states had deployed to keep out
the poor: exclusion and removal. The Edwards case arose during the Great
Depression. In response to the large-scale interstate migration of displaced and
impoverished families, several states began vigorous enforcement of laws that
made it a crime to transport a destitute person into the jurisdiction. Fred
Edwards was convicted under California's exclusion statute for driving his
brother-in-law, a citizen of the United States and a resident of Texas, from
Spur, Texas to Edwards' home in Marysville, California. The Court struck
down the California law on the ground that the Commerce Clause proscribes
any state attempt to isolate itself from national problems by restraining the
movement of poor people across its borders.65 The Edwards case will be
discussed in more detail below,66 but for now it suffices to note that the
decision directly disapproved the then-common practice of exclusion and that
its reasoning sounded the death knell for interstate removal legislation as
well.67 After Edwards, states were left with the settlement concept (enforced
61. See CASES AND MATERIALS ON LAW AND POVERTY 130-33 (George Cooper et al. eds., 1973).
62. But see MORELAND COMM'N ON WELFARE, STATE OF N.Y., PUBLIC WELFARE IN THE STATE
OF NEW YORK 27-28 (1963) (arguing successfully against adoption of durational residence restrictions in
New York State on the ground that "the present laws are sufficient to protect the taxpayer without
penalizing the unfortunate").
63. Mandelker, supra note 44, at 59 (citing Falk, Social Action on Settlement Laws, 18 Soc. SERV.
REV. 288 (1944); Allan Vestal, Freedom of Movement, 41 IOWA L. REV. 6 (1955)); see also BERNEY ET
AL., supra note 45, at 683 (describing welfare length-of-residence restrictions as vestiges of settlement
concept and arguing that such restrictionsare incongruous in the United States and "found their way into
American law" largely as a result of "historical accident").
64. Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941).
65. Id. at 173.
66. See infra notes 173-90 and accompanying text.
67. As discussed above, removal legislation generally authorized local authorities to eject unsettled
poor people and remove them to their original place of residence. Since this practice-at least as applied
to migrants from another state-interfered with the interstate movement of poor persons quite as much as
the exclusion measure invalidated in Edwards, the decision necessarily implied the unconstitutionality of
removal laws. See Note, Constitutional Law-Interstate Commerce-State May Not Exclude Indigent
Migrants, 42 COLuM. L. REV. 139 & n.3 (1942) (contending that removal statutes are unconstitutional
after Edwards because, like exclusion statutes, they are "antithetical to the idea of national unity embraced
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through durational residence requirements for public assistance) as the only
direct, lawful method for discouraging immigration by poor people, though
even here the Court's decision cast considerable constitutional doubt.68
2. The Apparent Demise of Settlement: Shapiro v. Thompson
The Edwards Court's discomfort with the settlement concept flourished into
full-fledged condemnation 28 years later in Shapiro v. Thompson.69 Plaintiffs
in Shapiro were impoverished mothers with minor children who were denied
Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) benefits7' because they did
not satisfy a state length-of-residence requirement. 7' As a result of these state
laws, poor families that had recently relocated across state lines found them-
selves without the means for basic subsistence. Plaintiff Vivian Thompson was
a pregnant 19-year-old and mother of one child who had moved from
Dorchester, Massachusetts to live with her mother in Hartford, Connecticut
after her husband abandoned her.72 Though Thompson and her child were
needy and otherwise eligible for assistance, Connecticut denied them AFDC
benefits because they had resided in the state for less than one year. Another
plaintiff, Minnie Harrell, had moved with her three children from New York
to Washington, D.C. because she was suffering from cancer and wished to be
near her family.73 Though destitute, Harrell and her children were denied
AFDC benefits because they had not "resided in the District for one year
immediately preceding the date of filing [for assistance]."" A third plaintiff
had lived in Pennsylvania with her minor children for twelve years, but, in
1965, moved temporarily to South Carolina to care for her invalid grand-
in the commerce clause"). Statutes authorizing the intrastate removal of general relief recipients continued
to be enforced well after the Edwards decision. See Town of Vanden Broek v. Reitz, 191 N.W.2d 913
(Wis.), appeal dismissed, 406 U.S. 902 (1971) (upholding Wisconsin statute that authorized local officials
to seek court order conditioning receipt of state welfare benefits on the recipient's return to her "place of
legal settlement").
68. The Edwards Court recounted the origins and underlying rationale of settlement restrictions on
relief, but observed that "in an industrial society, the task of providing assistance to the needy has ceased
to be local in character" so that "the theory of the Elizabethan poor laws no longer fits the facts." 314 U.S.
at 174-75. The Court's conclusion on this score left durational residence restrictions vulnerable to much
the same Commerce Clause analysis as had prevailed against Califbrnia's exclusion statute. This point is
developed infra notes 173-90 and accompanying text.
69. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
70. Social Security Act, tit. 4, 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-08 (1988).
71. The Court in Shapiro consolidated three appeals from lower court decisions that had invalidated
durational residence requirements imposed by Connecticut, Pennsylvania, and the District of Columbia.
The reference to "state" shall for convenience include the District of Columbia, though the federal status
of that jurisdiction raised different constitutional questions. Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 621-27, 641-42. At the
time Shapiro reached the Supreme Court, 46 states imposed durational residence requirements on their
public assistance programs. Id. at 676 & n.35 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
72. Id. at 623.
73. Id. at 624.
74. Id. at 624 n.3 (quoting D.C. CODE ANN. § 3-203 (1967)).
Yale Law & Policy Review
mother. When she and her children returned to Pennsylvania two years later,
the state denied them AFDC under a durational residence statute.75
The Court held that these statutes abridged the Constitution's guarantee of
equal protection of the laws. The Court began by observing that state
durational residence requirements create two classes of needy families
"indistinguishable from each other except that one is composed of residents
who have resided a year or more, and the second of residents who have
resided less than a year, in a jurisdiction."76 On this basis alone, noted the
Court, destitute mothers and children in the second statutory category were
denied the benefits upon which their subsistence might well depend. The Court
then examined, and rejected, each of the governmental interests assertedly
advanced by this discrimination. The principal justification offered was that
durational residence restrictions served as a "protective device" to safeguard
state treasuries against a feared "influx of poor families in need of assist-
ance."' People who required public assistance within their first year of
residence, the states argued, were likely to draw benefits on a long-term basis.
Discouraging the movement of such people into the state would therefore
promote the "fiscal integrity" of state public assistance systems.78
The Court readily acknowledged that denying subsistence benefits to
newcomers bore a rational relationship to the goal of deterring in-migration
by low-income families. But it unequivocally declared that goal to be "constitu-
tionally impermissible. "' Nor did it make any constitutional difference if the
state aimed to discourage entry by all poor families, or only those families
migrating to take advantage of a more generous public assistance program.
"[A] State may no more try to fence out those indigents who seek higher
welfare benefits," the Court concluded, "than it may try to fence out indigents
generally. "' In either event, the Court explained, the goal of inhibiting the
interstate migration of economically disadvantaged families was irreconcilably
at odds with the fundamental right to travel that the Court had long found to
inhere in the very notion of a "federal union."8
The Court went on to consider the other, more general, governmental
interests advanced in support of the residence restrictions: fiscal planning,
administrative convenience, and avoidance of fraud. The Court conceded that
75. Id. at 626. A number of other plaintiffs presented similarly compelling circumstances. Id. at 622-
27.
76. Id. at 627.
77. Id. at 627-29. The state officials who defended durational residency requirements in Shapiro
"frankly" conceded that the purpose of conditioning AFDC eligibility on length of residence was to
"discourag[e] entry of those who come needing relief." Id. at 623 (quoting district court opinion reported
at 270 F. Supp. 331, 336-37 (D. Conn. 1967)).
78. Id. at 627-28.
79. Id. at 629.
80. Id. at 631.
81. Id. at 629-33 (quoting United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757-58 (1966)).
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these interests, unlike the rank desire to deter poor families from entering the
state, were legitimate. It concluded, however, that none of them was rationally
promoted by a durational residence requirement, and that, in any event, such
a restriction could be justified only by a "compelling state interest" because
it "serves to penalize the exercise of [the] right [to travel]."8"
In Shapiro, the Court advanced the work that it had begun in Edwards. It
eradicated the vestiges of settlement that most American welfare laws still
retained and thereby eliminated the last of the three main devices that states
had employed to keep poor people outside their borders. Given the breadth of
Shapiro's holding, the forty-six states that had conditioned welfare receipt on
length of residence were legally compelled to abandon the practice.83 Thus
began the only period in American history not marred by widespread, overt
state efforts to deter the interstate movement of poor people.
Edwards and Shapiro not only made advances on the constitutional plane,
but also broadened the country's perspective on the issues of poverty, poor
people, and governmental responsibility. In the Edwards decision-issued
during the Great Depression when the economic submersion of the middle class
forced a social reevaluation of the causes and meaning of poverty-the
Court squarely rejected the long-held view that "a person .. . .without
employment and without funds . . . constitutes a 'moral pestilence.'""5
"Poverty and immorality are not synonymous," the Court proclaimed.8 6 Nor
did the Edwards Court accept the traditional view that "relief is solely the
responsibility of local government. "87 In an "industrial society," such matters
had clearly acquired national status. "[T]he theory of the Elizabethan poor
laws," the Court opined, "no longer fits the facts."88 By the time the Court
decided Shapiro, the positivist, New Deal ideology that was still nascent during
the Depression had become established orthodoxy.89 In the process, the
dominant social paradigm had evolved from "industrial society" to "welfare
state." Consistent with this evolution (though perhaps ahead of it), the Shapiro
Court surpassed Edwards 's rehabilitation of the poor and endeavored to remove
82. Id. at 634.
83. See Note, Residence Requirements in State Public Welfare Statutes, 51 IOWA L. REV. 1080, 1091-
95 (1966) (cataloguing state durational residency restrictions on public assistance). A number of states and
localities immediately attempted, without lasting success, to circumvent Shapiro with new legislation. See,
e.g., Lopez v. Wyman, 329 F. Supp. 483 (W.D.N.Y. 1971), aff'd, 404 U.S. 1055 (1972) (voiding
durational residence requirements re-enacted by New York after Shapiro); Rivera v. Dunn, 329 F. Supp.
554 (D. Conn. 1971), aff'd, 404 U.S. 1054 (1972) (voiding durational residence requirement re-enacted
by Connecticut after Shapiro). See generally BERNEY ET AL., supra note 45, at 686-89 (1975) (discussing
post-Shapiro legislation); CASES AND MATERIALS ON LAW AND POVERTY, supra note 61, at 131.
84. See, e.g., Katz, supra note 29, at 211-12.
85. Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 177 (1941).
86. Id.
87. Id. at 174.
88. Id. at 174-75.
89. See, e.g., Laurence H. Tribe, The Curvature of Constitutional Space: W7at Lawyers Can Learn
from Modern Physics, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1989).
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the stigma that attached to a poor person's receipt of needs-based public
assistance. The Court regarded such benefits in the modern positive state as
comparable to any other government-provided service, if not to more tradition-
al forms of "property":'
[W]e do not perceive why a mother who is seeking to make a new life for herself
and her children should be regarded as less deserving because she considers...
the level of a State's public assistance. Surely such a mother is no less deserving
than a mother who moves into a particular State in order to take advantage of its
better educational facilities.9'
Shapiro traced the furthest reach of a 30-year discourse on poverty through
which the Supreme Court attempted to lower some of the structural barriers
that keep poor people from full and equal participation in the life of the
national community.92 Only a year after Shapiro, however, this enterprise
came to a halt. In a series of cases rejecting claims by welfare recipients, the
newly-constituted Burger Court shifted from a poverty discourse that regarded
the economically depressed as worthy members of our society to one that
validated and reinforced negative stereotypes about the poor.93 As this tradi-
tional ideology of poverty again became entrenched in the judicial sphere, and
economic hard times returned, state efforts to fence out the poor resurfaced.
90. See Charles Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964). See generally Cass Sunstein,
Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 875 (1987) (discussing notion of ideological baselines in
American constitutional law).
91. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 632 (1969).
92. The discourse began with Edwards, resurfaced in several electoral rights cases that dismantled
certain economic barriers to formal political participation by the poor, see, e.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd.
of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (declaring poll taxes unconstitutional); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134
(1972) (invalidating ballot access fees), and culminated with Shapiro and Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254,
265 (1970) (describing poverty as a structural problem and welfare as a response that can "help bring within
the reach of the poor the same opportunities that are available to others to participate meaningfully in the
life of the community"). For a discussion of the role that the Shapiro litigation played in the welfare rights
movement, see Edward V. Sparer, The Right to Welfare, in THE RIGHTS OF AMERIcANS: WHAT THEY
ARE-WHAT THEY SHOULD BE 74-76 (Norman Dorsen ed., 1971); see also ARYEH NEIER, ONLY
JUDGMENT: THE LIMITS OF LITIGATION IN SOCIAL CHANGE 133-40 (1982).
93. See, e.g., Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) (upholding state law that denied full AFDC
benefits to families with more than five children); Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971) (upholding
warrantless visits by social services personnel seeking evidence of cohabitation in AFDC mothers' homes).
For a thorough discussion of the premises and assumptions underlying the Court's decisions in Dandridge,
Wyman, and other poverty cases, see Thomas Ross, The Rhetoric of Poverty: Their Immorality, Our
Helplessness, 79 GEO. L.J. 1499 (1991); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public
Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29, 72-73 (1985) (discussing the stereotyped notions about the poor ratified by
the Court in Dandridge).
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II. THE RESURGENCE OF STATE EXCLUSIONARY MEASURES:
CURRENT DURATIONAL RESIDENCE RESTRICTIONS ON WELFARE
The social and political impulse to designate certain groups as "other,"
vilify them, and exclude them from the mainstream runs deep in American
history94 and has been resistant to judicial correction. This impulse was
visible in the refusal of the southern states to abide by the Supreme Court's
desegregation decrees of the 1950s and 1960s. 9' It was also evident, though
in a less dramatic context, in state efforts to re-impose welfare length-of-
residence restrictions immediately following Shapiro's unequivocal invalidation
of such measures. 96 Similar forces appear to animate the current round of
state welfare restrictions that seek to deter in-migration by poor people. The
re-emergence of such laws after repeated and seemingly definitive constitution-
al condemnation by the Supreme Court is a remarkable phenomenon, especially
given the de minimis fiscal payoff for the offending states. 97 This Part will
describe some of the recent state laws and proposals, and will offer several
explanations for their appearance.
A. Varieties of Residence Restrictions
The current vintage of state durational residence requirements targets two
types of public benefit programs: Aid to Families With Dependent Children
("AFDC") and general assistance. AFDC is a program of "cooperative
federalism" in which participating states receive federal matching funds to
operate welfare programs that conform to federal standards.9" AFDC is a
categorical, needs-based program,99 and any impoverished family that meets
the eligibility criteria is entitled to benefits."0 Federal law gives participating
states discretion to establish a statewide "standard of need" and to fix benefit
94. See, e.g., ROBERT H. WIEBE, THE SEGMENTED SOCIETY 66 (1975).
95. See, e.g., Robert M. Cover, The Origins of Judicial Activism in the Protection of Minorities, 91
YALE L.J. 1287 (1982).
96. See cases cited supra note 83.
97. See inftr notes 145-48 and accompanying text.
98. Congress created the AFDC program in 1935, under Title IV of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 601-08. Title IV does not establish a federally administered or wholly uniform national welfare system,
nor does it require states to operate an AFDC program in their jurisdictions. Rather, the law authorizes
50 to 80% federal financing for any state AFDC program adopted and administered in conformance with
federal guidelines. States need not participate in the AFDC program-although all 50 states have elected
to do so-but once a state chooses to participate, it must abide by the applicable federal criteria. GREEN
BOOK, supra note 2, at 566-67. The median AFDC grant for a family of three in the United States as of
January 1992 was 39.3% of the federal poverty income guidelines. Id.
99. To qualify, a family must not only be impoverished, it must also contain a minor dependent child
who is "deprived of parental support" in that one or both parents are deceased, absent, disabled, or, in
limited circumstances, unemployed. 42 U.S.C. § 606(a) (1991).
100. § 602(a)(10)(A); see King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968).
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levels at some percentage of that standard."0 ' AFDC levels vary significantly
from state to state; all states, however, have set their grants below officially
calculated subsistence levels."2 At present, federal law prohibits states from
restricting or denying AFDC benefits based upon the length of a family's
residence within the state." The Social Security Act, however, authorizes
the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) to "waive" this, or any
other, federal AFDC requirement, upon application by a state that wishes to
conduct an "experimental, pilot or demonstration" project."
"General assistance" is the generic term for public assistance programs that
are funded and authorized exclusively by state and local law. 05 For the most
part, general assistance programs are non-categorical; that is, they are open
to all needy residents who meet the financial eligibility criteria. " 6 These
programs do not receive federal reimbursement and are therefore free from
federal restraints and oversight; they are the residual programs of last resort
that make up the ultimate safety net for individuals who are destitute but do
not fit into a federally-assisted category (e.g., aged, blind, disabled or family
with dependent child). Though some two-parent families with minor children
receive state general assistance because they do not meet the categorical
standards for AFDC, the typical recipient of general relief is a
non-disabled"° adult under 65 years of age with no minor children. General
assistance recipients have traditionally been regarded as the unworthy poor and
101. Federal law requires participating states to calculate and update a needs standard that approximates
the cost of bare essentials, such as food, clothing and housing, see 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(23) (1991); 45
C.F.R. § 233.20(a) (1992), but there is no federal requirement that states actually provide AFDC grants
at or above the needs level, see Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 408-09, 413 (1970).
102. No state provides AFDC benefits at or above the federal poverty index. CENTER FOR BUDGET
& POLICY PRIoRrrIES, SELECTED BACKGROUND MATERIAL ON WELFARE PROGRAMS tbl. 1 (Feb. 21, 1992)
[hereinafter BACKGROUND MATERIAL]. Nearly three-quarters of the states have seen fit to fix benefit
amounts below 50% of the federal poverty line. Id. Thirty-six states currently hold AFDC benefit amounts
below their own estimates of a bare subsistence level. No RELIEF, supra note 6, at 4.
103. See 45 C.F.R. § 233.40 (1992) (state "may not impose any residence requirement which excludes
any individual who is a resident of the State"); 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(2) (1992) (the need standard and
grant amount must be "uniformly applied throughout the State"). Benefit programs wholly funded by the
federal government also prohibit the use of durational residence requirements. See, e.g., 7 C.F.R.
§ 246.7(b)(1) (1992) (Special Supplemental Food Program for Women, Infants and Children); 7 C.F.R.
§ 273.3 (1992) (Food Stamp Program).
104. 42 U.S.C. § 1315 (1991), discussed infra at notes 244-58 and accompanying text.
105. See generally IRIS J. LAy ET AL., THE STATES AND THE POOR 35-36 (1993).
106. Some states, however, limit eligibility for general assistance to specific categories of poor people,
and others restrict the number of weeks an impoverished individual may receive assistance, effectively
creating another category of needy but ineligible individuals. See No RELIEF, supra note 6, at 5. Many
states have only a narrowly limited general assistance program, or no program at all. See id. at 2, 4-5.
For instance, Michigan eliminated its general relief program in 1991. See Jason DeParle, The Sorrows,
and Surprises, After a Welfare Plan Ends, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14, 1992, at Al. One year later, Illinois
closed its general relief program to persons deemed employable, and Maryland barred assistance to any
person without a disability expected to last for at least twelve months. See No RELIEF, supra note 6, at
2.
107. "Non-disabled" for these purposes means not so thoroughly disabled as to satisfy the definition
of disability used to determine eligibility for federal benefits under Title II or Title XVI of the Social
Security Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d) (1988).
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special stigma attaches to this form of relief,' though for the past several
decades the women and children who receive AFDC have similarly been seen
as outcasts whose very need is taken as evidence of moral and personal
failure. Y
The length-of-residence restrictions recently imposed by various states on
AFDC and general assistance applicants have assumed two basic forms. First
is the durational residence restriction of the traditional type, which absolutely
bars newcomers from receiving public assistance during a specified period of
initial residence. This is precisely the kind of eligibility condition that the
Supreme Court declared unconstitutional in Shapiro v. Thompson. "' At
present, Wisconsin is the only state that imposes this form of residence
requirement. Under Wisconsin law, a destitute individual who meets all other
eligibility criteria for general assistance will nevertheless be denied relief if
she has not resided in the state for at least two months immediately prior to
her application for benefits."' Thus, a poor person contemplating a move
to Wisconsin must consider whether she could survive for sixty days bereft
of funds if employment cannot immediately be secured."'
The second, and more common, type of residence restriction does not deny
all assistance to newcomers, but limits the benefits available during an initial
residence period. This second option, frequently termed a "two-tiered" welfare
system, calculates the new resident's benefit with reference to the level of
assistance available in the state of origin. At least seven states currently employ
or have proposed some version of a two-tiered model. California imposed a
two-tiered durational residence scheme on its AFDC program in late 1992.113
Under the California program, AFDC grants to recently arrived families are
capped at the lesser of the state's regular benefit level or the grant amount the
family would have received in its prior state of residence." 4 The California
108. See e.g., HANDLER, supra note 58, at 21-24.
109. See, e.g., Martha L. Fineman, Images of Mothers in Poverty Discourses, 1991 DUKE L.J. 274
(1991); see also America's Most Wanted, Republicans Turn Welfare Mothers into Villains of '92 Campaign,
TORONTO STAR, June 7, 1992, at F1 [hereinafter America's Most Wanted]. The pariah status of poor
women and children, though perhaps more acute in recent years, is by no means a new phenomenon. See
PIVEN & CLOWARD, supra note 2, at 165-77.
110. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 623, 642 (1969).
111. WIS. STAT. § 49.015 (1992).
112. Wisconsin adopted its durational residence requirement in 1986 and tightened the restriction in
1987 by repealing an exemption for persons who had entered the state "without the intent to seek benefits."
See Jones v. Milwaukee County, 485 N.W.2d 21, 22-24 (Wis. 1992). The Wisconsin Supreme Court
recently upheld the restriction against state and federal equal protection challenges. Id.
113. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 11450.03 (West 1993). The Governor of California had proposed
a virtually identical plan as part of the "Taxpayer Protection Act," a ballot initiative defeated by the voters
in November 1992. See Vlae Kershner, Welfare Reduction Defeated, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 4, 1992, at A12.
114. Califbrnia received approval for its durational residence restriction from the federal Department
of Health and Human Services in November 1992. See California Cleared to Pay Less in Welfare to State
Newcomers, CHI. TRm., Nov. 13, 1992, at 4. A "waiver" from HHS was necessary because federal law
proscribes state durational residency restrictions on AFDC eligibility. See 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(2)(iii)
(1992). HHS previously approved a Califbrnia proposal to "limilt] (for a 12-month period) the grant level
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plan, which refers to the reduced benefits provided newcomers as "relocation
grants," affects all families with less than one year continuous, current resi-
dence in the state." 5 Since the AFDC levels (and the cost-of-living) in
California exceed those in most states, the legislation will deny a majority of
new AFDC families the payment thought minimally necessary for essential
needs. 6 Illinois has authorized a nearly identical two-tiered model for its
AFDC and general assistance programs, and Iowa and Pennsylvania have been
considering similar proposals." 7
A second variant of the two-tiered model provides new residents with a
reduced percentage of the usual state grant, or the payment the applicant would
have received in her last place of residence (not to exceed the enacting state's
usual grant), whichever is greater. Minnesota incorporated this version of the
two-tiered scheme into its general assistance program in 1991.8 Under
Minnesota law, a needy person who has resided in the state for less than six
months may receive only sixty percent of the state's regular general assistance
grant." 9 If, however, the individual received public assistance in her last
state of residence, she is eligible for an equal amount in Minnesota, up to the
grant level provided to longer-term residents."12 The Minnesota scheme thus
leaves many destitute newcomers to attempt the near impossible task of
subsisting for six months on $122 per month. 12' New York imposed a similar
restriction on its general assistance program effective July 1992.122 In con-
for families moving to Califbrnia to the lesser of Califbrnia's grant level or the [AFDC level] of the State
of previous residence." See Letter from Russell S. Gould, Secretary, California Health and Welfare
Agency, to Jo Anne Barnhart, Assistant Secretary for Children and Families, U.S. Department of Health
and Human Services 5 (May 19, 1992) (on file with author); Letter from Jo Anne Barnhart, Assistant
Secretary for Children and Families, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, to Russell S. Gould,
Secretary, Califbrnia Health and Welfare Agency (July 14, 1992) (on file with author). The proposal died,
however, when the ballot initiative in which it appeared failed to win public approval. See Kershner, supra
note 113.
115. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 11450.03(a); Letter from Russell Gould to Jo Anne Barnhart,
supra note 114, at 5. The Califbrnia legislation was preliminarily enjoined by a federal district court in
January 1993. Green v. Anderson, 811 F. Supp. 516 (E.D. Cal. 1993).
116. See BACKGROUND MATERIAL, supra note 102, tbls. 1, 4 & 5.
117. The Illinois plan applies to new residents who received public assistance at any point during the
final twelve months in their prior state of residence. Ill. Pub. Act 87-860 (1992). Such persons are
disqualified for one year from receiving Illinois assistance at a higher rate than was available in the prior
state. Id. The Iowa House of Representatives adopted a measure identical to the Illinois plan, but the
measure was deleted in the conference process with the Iowa Senate. See H-5819, S-5667, S.F. 2355, 74th
Iowa Gen. Assembly, 1992 Session. Pennsylvania is also considering a proposal identical to the Illinois
plan except that the Pennsylvania version limits benefits to all newly-arrived residents, not only to those
who had recently received assistance in their prior states. See H.R. 2577, Pa. Gen. Assembly, 1992
Session.
118. MINN. STAT. § 256D.065. The Minnesota statute is currently under challenge. See Mitchell v.
Steffan, 487 N.W.2d 896 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992) (appeal pending).
119. MINN. STAT. § 256D.065.
120. §§ 256D.065, 256D.06.
121. See §§ 256D.065, 256D.06, subd. 1.
122. N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 158(0 (Consol. 1992). The New York law covers all individuals who
apply for relief within six months of moving into the state and sets the grant level at 80% of the regular
benefit unless the applicant could have received a larger grant in her prior state of residence. In that case,
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junction with this residence restriction, welfare administrators in New York
have been directed to offer newcomers transportation expenses for immediate
return to their "original state. 3
A third version of the two-tiered model sets the benefit level of a recently
arrived family at the amount payable in the state of origin, whether that amount
is larger or smaller than the enacting state's grant. Wisconsin adopted this plan
for its AFDC program,24 and recently secured approval from the Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services to implement the scheme on a demonstra-
tion basis." The state has selected six counties for participation and will
apply the two-tiered program to families that request AFDC within six months
of establishing Wisconsin residency. 26 As the state has designated the
counties closest to the Illinois border as demonstration sites-its express aim
being to discourage migration of poor (mostly African-American) families from
the Chicago area where benefit levels are lower 27-this plan will in most
cases deny recently-arrived families the full measure of assistance available
to longer term residents.
B. Residence Restrictions Analyzed
The state welfare reforms discussed above diverge in certain details, but
they all share a common purpose that links them to the poor-law traditions of
settlement and removal: the underlying objective in each instance is to deter
in-migration by poor people. The goal of "settlement" and durational residence
conditions has always been, as the defendants in Shapiro v. Thompson con-
fessed, to "discourag[e] entry of those who come needing relief." 2' And so
it is with the latest incarnations of this policy. Current proponents of residence
restrictions freely admit that the object is to close their borders to destitute
Americans from other states-a remarkable concession given that the Supreme
Court has repeatedly declared that object unconstitutional. 129 The governor
of California, to take one prominent example, campaigned for residence
the applicant receives the amount available in her state of origin up to the current New York grant level.
Id.
123. See Limited Home Relief supra note 10, at 17.
124. wis. STAT. § 49.19(llm) (1992).
125. See Letter from Jo Anne Barnhart, Assistant Secretary for Children and Families, U.S. Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services, to Gerald Whitburn, Secretary, Wisconsin Department of Health and
Social Services (July 27, 1992) (on file with author).
126. Wis. STAT. § 49.19(llm)(c) (1992). The two-tiered plan does not apply to families that have
resided in the state for over three months and can demonstrate at least 13 weeks of employment since
moving into the state. § 49.19(llm)(am). The plan is currently scheduled to take effect in January 1995.
Wisconsin Application for SSA Section 1115 Demonstration Project, App. No. 92-3-WO-010, June 26,
1992, at 34 [hereinafter Wisconsin Application].
127. See id. at 4-5.
128. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 623 (1969) (quoting district court opinion reported at 270
F. Supp. 331, 336-37 (D. Conn. 1967)).
129. See Shapiro, 394 U.S. 618; Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941).
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restrictions by exhorting voters to "stop out of state welfare recipients from
moving to California."130 In the more sedate jargon of inter-bureaucratic
communication, California explained to the U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services that the purpose of its AFDC "relocation grant" is to "reduce
the incentive for families to move to California to receive public assist-
ance. "131 Wisconsin politicians openly agitated for state residence restrictions
on the theory that "[a] two-tiered welfare system will quickly eliminate abuse
by discouraging the out-of-state recipients' migration to Wisconsin." 132 And
Minnesota legislators candidly expressed their "primary objective" as
"deter[ring] migration of low income individuals into [the State]. " 133
The most benign explanation for these welfare restrictions is that they seek
to create a relatively closed system within which a state can establish especially
comprehensive social programs without risking the uncontrollable escalation
of welfare costs that would accompany any large in-migration of new recipi-
130. Direct Mail Solicitation from Governor Pete Wilson (on file with the author) (emphasis omitted).
Governor Wilson also campaigned fur this restriction with television spots featuring statements such as,
"It upsets me when I see people coming into this state and becoming freeloaders on our welfare system."
See John Wildermuth & Vlae Kershner, Campaign Insider, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 5, 1992, at A4; see also
Green v. Anderson, 811 F. Supp. 516 (E.D. Cal. 1993) (noting that the apparent purpose of Califbrnia's
durational residence legislation "is to deter migration of poor people into the State").
131. Application of Califbrnia Department of Social Services to U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services for Approval of Califbrnia Welfare Reform Demonstration Project, App. No. 92-3-WR-001, Apr.
7, 1992, at 17 [hereinafter California Application].
132. BOARD OF SUPERVISORS, KENOSHA COUNTY, Wis., RESOLUTION IN SUPPORT OF WELFARE
REFORM (Jan. 2, 1992). The Kenosha County statement was made in support of Wisconsin's proposed
"two-tier" AFDC program. Milwaukee County Executive Tom Ament expressed a similar view, stating
that the two-tiered AFDC program "will show that there has been a migration, and hopefully, this will put
a halt to that." See Wisconsin Plan Aims to Discourage Immigration of Welfare Recipients, L.A. TIMES,
June 4, 1992, at A12. It is similarly evident that the object of durational residence restrictions in
Wisconsin's General Assistance program is "to discourage welfare recipients from neighboring states from
migrating to Wisconsin.. . ." Jones v. Milwaukee County, 485 N.W.2d 21, 29 (Wis. 1992) (Heffernan,
C.J., dissenting). The state legislative sponsor of this eligibility restriction argued that absent such
legislation, "State and county governments and the taxpayer will have no defense against persons who enter
Wisconsin in order to take advantage of this state's generous welfare benefits." Id. at 29 n. I (quoting
amicus brief of Wisconsin State Representative David Prosser, Jr.).
133. Mitchell v. Steffen, 487 N.W.2d 896, 902 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992). The senate author of the
Minnesota statute urged its passage expressly as a method of discouraging in-migration by poor people:
I look down at the courthouse, and I see people coming in each and every day. And they're
getting assistance. . . . [T]here are people who have come, because welfare is better than the
state in which they originated from [sic].... That person came in here on a train and now we're
going to give him 203 bucks. Well, I'd rather have them go to another state and get their 203
bucks.
Quoted in Mitchell v. Steffan, No. C8-91-11691, at 4 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Jan. 8, 1992). In New York,
welfare officials have diplomatically described the purpose behind the new residence restrictions as
"mak[ing] the decision of whether to move to New York State fiscally neutral for persons who may need
public assistance when they enter the State." NEW YORK STATE DEP'T OF SOCIAL SERVS., REGULATORY
IMPACT STATEMENT FOR 18 NYCRR § 352.29 (Consol. 1992) [hereinafter REGULATORY IMPACT
STATEMENT].
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ents. 134 State and local officials pressed precisely this position in Shapiro v.
Thompson and in earlier congressional hearings, arguing that judicial or
legislative elimination of durational residence restrictions "would result in a
heavy influx of individuals into States providing the most generous bene-
fits. "13 Although that argument may have seemed plausible in 1969,136
twenty years have now passed since the Shapiro Court outlawed durational
residence requirements, and the feared mass migration of poor people to high-
benefit states has never materialized. To the contrary, poor people have
migrated at the same rates and in the same directions as the population at
large. 137 Indeed, throughout the late seventies and early eighties, poor people
moved, along with other Americans, from the northeast and midwest to the
south and sunbelt states, where welfare levels are significantly lower than
average. 
138
The benign explanation for the latest outbreak of state residence restrictions
is implausible for another reason: the proponents of these measures have
pressed them not to facilitate unusually generous benefits for current state
residents, but rather as part of a broader campaign to cut spending for all poor
people. New York, for example, adopted its durational residence requirement
in conjunction with a package of general welfare cuts that includes a forty-five
day waiting period for all general assistance applicants, severe restrictions upon
the availability of emergency relief, and reductions in Medicaid coverage. 139
In California, the governor proposed durational residence restrictions as one
element of a program that included a ten-percent across-the-board cut in AFDC
benefits followed by an additional fifteen-percent cut for families receiving
assistance longer than six months. t" It is, therefore, difficult to maintain that
states have barred their doors to outsiders in order to enhance welfare benefits
for existing residents.
134. See Margaret K. Rosenheim, Shapiro v. Thompson: 'The Beggars are Coming to Town, " 1969
Sup. CT. REV. 303, 318-19; see also Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 674-75 (1969) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that "[Jinvalidation of welfare residence requirements might have the unfortunate
consequence of discouraging... State Governments from establishing unusually generous welfare programs
... because of fears that the program would cause an influx of persons seeking higher welfare payments").
135. 394 U.S. at 628-29 (citing Hearings on H.R. 10032 Before the House Comm. on Ways and
Means, 87th Cong. 2d Sess. 309-10, 644 (1962); Hearings on H.R. 6000 Before the Senate Comm. on
Finance, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 324-27 (1950)).
136. But see Peter Kasius, W7at Happens in a State Without Residence Requirements, in RESIDENCE
LAWS 20-22 (National Travelers Aid Ass'n ed., 1956) (noting the absence of "any evidence whatever that
the availability of assistance is what attracts ... people to New York City"). Peter Kasius was a Deputy
Commissioner of the New York State Department of Social Welfare in 1956, a time at which New York
imposed no durational residence restrictions on public benefit eligibility. Id.
137. BARBARA LEYSER ET AL., BEYOND THE MYTHS: FAMIL1ES HELPED BY THE AFDC PROGRAM
13-14 (2d ed. 1985).
138. Id.
139. 1992 N.Y. Laws ch. 41.
140. See Letter from Russell Gould to Jo Anne Barnhart, supra note 114.
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Nevertheless, some states contend that they already provide generous
welfare benefits... and that those assistance levels can be sustained only if
the state employs residence restrictions to curtail the in-migration of new
beneficiaries.142 Here again, the argument does not persuade. First, the states
that have proposed or adopted residence restrictions have little or no objective
evidence that benefit levels actually influence migration-much less data
quantifying that influence.1 43 In one telling episode, California officials who
had testified in support of residence restrictions were forced to concede to
legislators that "the state had no data to show the impact of higher welfare
benefits on the migration of poor people to California."' 44 Indeed, the data
the state did have showed that the percent of newcomers receiving AFDC had
declined throughout the 1980s. Nor do these states appear interested in
accounting for the fiscal impact of out-migration by poor people or factoring
in cost-of-living differentials among states.14' Furthermore, even if one were
to assume a causal relationship between benefit levels and migration, the
potential savings from durational residence requirements are minuscule. In
1991, state expenditures on all AFDC benefits and administration amounted
to less than two percent of state budgets.'" The savings that California itself
projects for its "relocation grant" are measured in single hundredths of one
percent of the state budget. 147 And residence restrictions are an inefficient
way of achieving even these tiny reductions given the high cost of administer-
ing this type of eligibility condition. 148 Under these circumstances, the claim
141. Politicians repeatedly refer to state welfare programs as generous despite the fact that AFDC
and GA levels fall well below the poverty line in every state. See BACKGROUND MATERIAL, supra note
102. Inaccurate and inflammatory rhetoric of this sort has become a staple of the political discourse
surrounding poverty issues. See infm notes 149-63 and accompanying text.
142. See Wisconsin Application, supra note 126.
143. The one study that has been cited to support state officials' welfare magnet theory is Wahner
& Stepanik, supra note 8. Referring to this use of his study, Mr. Wahner stated: "It's been upsetting to
me that [people] have indicated that my study is about welfare magnetism, because it isn't. Certainly grant
level is one reason. But this incredible belief that the only reason people cross state lines is for welfare
benefits isn't accurate." Researcher: Poor Don't Move to Wisconsin, UPI, Dec. 26, 1988, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File.
144. Virginia Ellis, Is California's Welfare System Luring the Poor?, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 11, 1992,
at Al.
145. Id. (quoting Diana Pearce, visiting scholar at Stanford University, that "[ylou can't begin to
measure the net impact of migration without knowing how many move out as well as how many move in,"
and noting that state studies have not measured out-migration of welfare recipients).
146. See BACKGROUND MATERIAL, supra note 102. As one scholar put it, "if you're talking about
saving big dollars, AFDC is the last place you would start." Philip Harvey, quoted in Thomas Sancton,
How to Get America Off the Dole, TME, May 25, 1992, at 44.
147. See California Application, supra note 131, at 6; see also Rosenheim, supra note 134, at 327-28
(noting that even when durational residence requirements imposed a full one-year waiting period, only 0.5
to 2% of public benefit caseloads were affected).
148. California officials estimated that it would cost over 5 million dollars annually to administer
residence restrictions expected to generate less than 15 million in yearly savings to the state, and a like
savings to the federal government. See California Application, supra note 131, at 6. Historically, adminis-
trative costs surrounding residence and settlement issues have been excessively high. See CLARKE, supra
note 2, at 481; Mandelker, supra note 45, at 362. The famous Yates Report, which investigated poor-law
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that residence restrictions are necessary to maintain current levels of assistance
lacks credibility.
The most plausible explanation for the resurgence of durational residence
restrictions appears to be a political one. The prolonged economic recessions
of the late 1980s and early 1990s sparked budget crises in many states, bred
widespread popular discontent and created powerful incentives for politicians
to identify scapegoats. The most common targets have been poor people and
social welfare programs.149 In 1991, more than one third of the families
receiving AFDC suffered severe benefit cutbacks, and over three fifths of all
recipients nationwide experienced benefit reductions in real terms. 0 Follow-
ing the 1991 AFDC cuts, more than half of all families living below the
official poverty line were ineligible to participate in this anti-poverty
program." 1 Yet in 1992, 15 of 37 states surveyed slashed basic welfare
programs even further.'52 Proposals to eliminate welfare entirely acquired
a newly-minted respectability,'53 as political discourse became marked by
"an increasingly strident attack on the very idea of welfare."1 54 Political
observers have noted an increased willingness by politicians "to exploit [the]
welfare . . . issue" as a way "to tap the electorate's economic discontent."15 5
As one commentator put it, "[wielfare is a hot-button issue these days. Plenty
of politicians, especially on the right, see pay dirt in it."156
The political attractiveness of the welfare issue and the vulnerability of the
poor are neither new nor particularly difficult to explain. Poor people are
probably the least effective and most defenseless constituency in American
practices in New York in the early nineteenth century, estimated that fully one-ninth of all taxes raised for
poor relief were spent "in the payment of fees of justices, overseers, lawyers and constables to resolve
settlement disputes between localities that sought to avoid the payment of assistance." Secretary of State,
State of N.Y., 1824 Report on the Relief and Settlement of the Poor, reprinted in THE ALMSHOUSE
EXPERIENCE (David J. Rothman ed., 1971).
149. See, e.g., Editorial, Blaming the Victims in New York, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 1991, at 18 (noting
that Senate Republicans "blame the poor for almost the entire state budget gap of $500 million or more");
see also America's Most Wanted, supra note 109, at Ft.
150. See CENTER ON SOCIAL WELFARE POLICY & LAW, PUB. No. 165, 1991: THE POOR GOT POORER
AS WELFARE PROGRAMS WERE SLASHED 7, 9 (1992).
151. See GREEN BOOK, supra note 2, at 604-05, 621.
152. See No RELIEF, supra note 6, at 2.
153. See, e.g., Race Against lime, NEW REPUBLIC, May 25, 1992, at 1, 9 (calling for "radical shift
from the welfare model"); MICKEY KAUS, THE END OF EQUALITy (1992) (proposing to end all income
support programs and to substitute massive public jobs program). In line with this movement, some states
actually eliminated their general assistance programs. See supra note 106.
154. See, e.g., DeParle, supra note 106, at Al; see also Robert Greenstein & Edward Lazere, The
Dubious New Attack on Welfare, SACRAMENTO BEE, Jan. 19, 1992.
155. See Kevin Sack, The New Volatile Politics of Welfare, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 1992, § 1, at 1;
Sancton, supra note 146, at44. See generally THEODORE R. MARMOR ET AL., AMERICA'S MISUNDERSTOOD
WELFARE STATE (1990).
156. Neal R. Peirce, Cold Approaches to a Hot-Button Issue, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 11, 1992, at 890.
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politics. 17 Those who attack the poor put little at political risk and are
rarely, if ever, held accountable. This dynamic, and its role in what has come
to be known as "welfare scapegoating," is acknowledged even by established
political figures. Governor Cuomo of New York, for example, recently
remarked that "poor people don't have any power. That's why welfare's such
a terrific issue. Who's going to march against you, a 15-year-old girl with a
baby? She doesn't even get to the polls. "' On this logic, poor people from
other states present an irresistible target, being politically disabled as a result
of both poverty and geography. Indeed, so attractive a scapegoat are the out-
of-state poor, that the Governor of California showcased welfare residence
restrictions in his campaign for Proposition 165 even after the state legislature
had enacted an identical restriction, rendering the proposition obsolete."'
The politics of welfare would appear to explain why states have rushed to
impose durational residence restrictions without sufficient data or "mature
deliberation," "6o and despite the certainties that cost savings will be minimal
and that families caught in the political crossfire will suffer crushing conse-
quences. 161 Protectionist welfare policies, and the rhetoric that surrounds
them, not only isolate and ostracize the poor, but also pit state against
state, 62  recalling English historian G. M. Trevelyan's critique of the
Elizabethan Poor Laws: "The problem of the poor and of unemployment was
157. See Loffredo, supra note 27; see also San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S.
1, 37 (1970) (noting that "the ill-fed, ill-clothed and ill-housed [may be] among the most ineffective
participants in the political process').
158. Quoted in Sack, supra note 155, § 1, at 24.
159. See Wildermuth & Kershner, supra note 130, at A4.
160. But see Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 674 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (arguing that
Court should defer to state residence restrictions as the products of "mature deliberation").
161. This is not to suggest that other invidious factors do not animate exclusionary state policies,
especially given the intersection of race and poverty in the United States. For instance, it is difficult to
ignore the racial overtones in Wisconsin's crusade to halt in-migration by poor, African American families
from the Illinois border counties in and around Chicago. See Ellis, supra note 144 (noting focus of
Wisconsin officials on poor people "flooding across the border from Illinois to escape the crime in inner-
city Chicago and to take advantage of higher welfare benefits"); Rogers Worthington, Welfare Magnet
Attracts Fraud-And Paranoia, Cmn. TRIB., Jan. 24, 1992, at 5. The relationship between residence
restrictions and race is by no means a recent development. See, e.g., Kasius, supra note 136, at 20 (arguing
in 1956 that residence restrictions on public benefits trace largely to "attitudes toward minority groups").
162. The political discourse on durational residence requirements not only impugns and devalues poor
people, but also frequently includes accusations that neighboring states are attempting to "export" their
.welfare problem." See, e.g., Ellis, supra note 144 (noting complaints by politicians in California,
Washington, Vermont, Wisconsin, and New York about the inflow of recipients from lower-benefit states,
including Oregon, Idaho, New Hampshire, Illinois, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania). As one journalist
reported, "[w]elfare magnets are relative, of course. Iowa suspects they may be drawing people from
Missouri. And Minnesota is concerned about those North Dakotans. But then, top-paying Minnesota worries
about most surrounding states, including Wisconsin." Roger Worthington, supra note 161, at 5. For an
earlier example of interstate acrimony on this issue, see Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 168 (1941)
(argument for appellee); see also infra notes 284-86 and accompanying text.
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in its essence national-or at least regional-yet every petty parish dealt with
it separately, in a state of hostility to every other."13 Three centuries later,
American social welfare policy has begun to regress in this unfortunate
direction.
III. A COMMERCE CLAUSE ANALYSIS OF STATE RESIDENCE RESTRICTIONS
Article I, section 8 of the Constitution provides that Congress shall have
power to "regulate Commerce ... among the several States." The Commerce
Clause occupies only a tiny fraction of the Constitution's text, but it embodies
one of the principal innovations for which the federal convention of 1787 was
called. 1" Indeed, those who drafted the Constitution believed that political
union would be unsustainable unless authority to regulate interstate commerce
resided with the national government.'65 And, from the early nineteenth
century, the Court has regarded the clause as so critical to both the ideal and
reality of nationhood that it has interpreted this affirmative grant of
congressional power as a constitutional negative upon state interference with
interstate commerce.'" By the middle of this century, the Court began rou-
tinely to acknowledge the constitutional centrality of the Commerce Clause and
the judiciary's role in enforcing its values:
163. TREVELYAN, supra note 44, at 351-52.
164. See, e.g., JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 259
(1833); Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 325-26 (1979) ("The few simple words of the Commerce
Clause ... reflected a central concern of the Framers that was the immediate reason fbr calling the
Constitutional Convention: the conviction that in order to succeed, the new Union would have to avoid
the tendencies toward economic Balkanization that had plagued relations among the Colonies and later
among the States under the Articles of Confederation."); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 190
(1824) ("The power over commerce... was one of the primary objects for which the people of America
adopted their government.").
165. See THE FEDERALIST Nos. 6-9, 11 (Alexander Hamilton). See generally Albert S. Abel, The
Commerce Clause in the Constitutional Convention and in Contemporary Comment, 25 MINN. L. REV.
432 (1941).
166. See, e.g., South-Central Timber Dev. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 87 (1984) ('Although the
Commerce Clause is by its text an affirmative grant of power to Congress ... the Clause has long been
recognized as a self-executing limitation on the power of the States.... "). The theory that the Commerce
Clause itself restricts state power, even when Congress has not exercised its authority under the clause,
was first suggested by Chief Justice Marshall in Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 209 (1824)
(dictum). See also Willson v. Black-Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245, 252 (1827) (intimating
that state legislation violates the Constitution if "repugnant to the power to regulate commerce in its dormant
state"). See generally Martin H. Redish & Shane v. Nugent, The Dormant Commerce Clause and the
Constitutional Balance of Federalism, 1987 DuKE L.J. 569, 574-81 (tracing early doctrinal development
of the negative Commerce Clause). There is evidence that this interpretation of the Commerce Clause
accorded with the framers' expectations. In a letter written some years after the constitutional convention,
Madison expressed his understanding that the Commerce Clause was to operate "as a negative and
preventive provision against injustice among the states themselves, rather than as a power to be used for
the positive purpose of the General Government." Letter from James Madison to J.C. Cabell (Feb. 13,
1829), in 3 REcORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 478 (Max Farrand ed., 1911).
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The Commerce Clause is one of the most prolific sources of national power and
an equally prolific source of conflict with legislation of the state. While the
Constitution vests in Congress the power to regulate commerce among the States,
it does not say what the states may or may not do in the absence of congressional
action. . . . Perhaps even more than by interpretation of its written word, this
Court has advanced the solidarity and prosperity of this Nation by the meaning
it has given to these great silences of the Constitution.167
The Commerce Clause in its negative aspect shares with the Equal
Protection doctrine the goal of checking "repeated attempts by state legislatures
to exclude undesirable persons."168 Unlike expansive interpretations of the
Fourteenth Amendment, however, vigorous judicial enforcement of the
negative Commerce Clause enjoys a pan-ideological appeal uncommon in
constitutional law. It has frequently been observed that "even judges and
commentators ordinarily hesitant about federal judicial intervention into
legislative choice tend to support a relatively active role for the federal
judiciary 'when the centrifugal, isolating or hostile forces of localism are
manifested in state legislation.'"'69 Consequently, the negative Commerce
Clause has been the most fertile constitutional ground for invalidation of state
laws over the past several decades. 70 More to the point, the broad ideologi-
cal support enjoyed by the negative Commerce Clause insulates the doctrine
from the transient political shifts that have dramatically affected the Court's
interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Additionally, as will be seen, the
anti-discrimination principle embodied in the negative Commerce Clause
condemns state length-of-residence restrictions even more definitively than
Equal Protection doctrine as elaborated in Shapiro.'7'
167. H.P. Hood & Sons v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525, 534-35 (1949).
168. J. Morris Clark, Legislative Motivation and Fundamental Rights in Constitutional Law, 15 SAN
DEEGo L. REv. 953, 986-87 (1978).
169. See TRIBE, supra note 18, at 401 (quoting Ernest J. Brown, The Open Economy: Mr. Justice
Frankfurter and the Position of the Judiciary, 67 YALE L.J. 219, 220 (1957)). Shortly after his appointment
to the Court, Justice Scalia launched what appeared to be the opening volley of an extended conservative
campaign to dismantle the negative Commerce Clause. See Tyler Pipe Indus. v. Washington State Dep't
of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232, 265 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (critiquing
negative Commerce Clause doctrine as "an enterprise that [the Court] has been unable to justify by textual
support or even coherent nontextual theory, that it was almost certainly not intended to undertake, and that
it has not undertaken very well"); see also CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp., 481 U.S. 69, 94 (1987) (Scalia,
J., concurring). More recently, however, Justice Scalia has quiescently joined majority opinions setting
forth and applying the doctrine in its traditional form. See, e.g., Chemical Waste Management v. Hunt,
112 S. Ct. 2009 (1992); Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill v. Michigan Dep't of Natural Resources, 112 S.
Ct. 2019 (1992).
170. Despite the potency of the negative Commerce Clause as a constitutional check on state
legislation, it has only infrequently been engaged to safeguard individual rights. See, e.g., Dennis v.
Higgins, 111 S. Ct. 865 (1991); Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373 (1946); Edwards v. California, 314
U.S. 160 (1941).
171. The Court recently confirmed that the Commerce Clause creates federal "rights" enforceable
by individuals under the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Dennis, 111 S. Ct. 865.
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A. The Doctrinal Analysis
This section performs a standard Commerce Clause analysis on welfare
residence requirements. The doctrinal presentation proceeds along two lines.
First, length-of-residence requirements are measured against the principles
enunciated by the Court fifty years ago in Edwards v. California. " Next,
these requirements are assessed within the Court's most current framework
for adjudicating negative Commerce Clause claims. Under either analysis, state
legislation that discriminates against interstate migrants in the provision of
public assistance quite clearly fails constitutional scrutiny.
1. The Edwards Template
In Edwards v. California, the Court invalidated a California statute that
made it a misdemeanor to transport indigent, nonresidents into the state. Some
version of the statute had been on the books since 1860,173 but vigorous
enforcement of the proscription did not begin until the Great Depression, when
drought and economic collapse displaced millions of families and resulted in
unprecedented waves of interstate migration. In defense of its statute,
California asserted that it had experienced a "huge influx" of destitute families
fleeing intolerable conditions in other parts of the country, and that this "has
resulted in problems of health, morals, and especially finances . . . ."7 The
Court credited the state's claims of public health concern and dire fiscal
distress,'7 5 but concluded that any effort to address these ills by impeding
the migration of poor people unconstitutionally interfered with interstate
commerce. 7 6 Notably, the Court did not see fit to "balance" the state's
admittedly substantial interests against the burden imposed by the statute on
interstate commerce. Nor did the Court hesitate to void the statute on
Commerce Clause grounds even absent state interference with "commercial"
172. 314 U.S. 160.
173. Id. at 172.
174. Id. at 173. California's brief in the Supreme Court incorporated a breathtaking array of negative
stereotypes about poor people:
Underfed for many generations, they bring with them the various nutritional diseases of the South.
Their presence here upon public relief, with their habitual unbalanced diet and consequent lowered
body resistance, means a constant threat of epidemics. Venereal diseases and tuberculosis are common
with them, and are on the increase. The increase of rape and incest are [sic] readily traceable to the
crowded conditions in which these people are forced to live. Petty crime among them has featured
the criminal calendars of every community into which they have moved.
Id. at 167-68.
175. Id. At the same time, the Court rejected the notion that the immigration of poor people itself
threatened public morality. "Poverty and immorality are not synonymous," the Court declared. Id. at 177.
176. Id. at 173-74.
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activity." Rather, the Court held that the Commerce Clause categorically
proscribes any state effort to extricate itself from national problems by "the
simple expedient of shutting its gates to the outside world.""' No limitation
on state power is "more certain," the Court held, than "the prohibition against
attempts on the part of any single State to isolate itself from the difficulties
common to all of them by restraining the transportation of persons and
property across its borders."179 Viewing economic dislocation, poverty, and
relief of the needy as indisputably national problems, common to all states,
the Court had no difficulty concluding that California's exclusion statute
violated the Commerce Clause. 80
Edwards did not directly decide whether states may constitutionally deny
newcomers public assistance,' but the core principle and teaching of the
case distinctly answer this question in the negative. Durational residence
restrictions on welfare are parochial and isolationist in precisely the respect
that Edwards found to be impermissible." 2 Whatever may be their ultimate
aim, such restrictions uniformly seek to insulate the enacting state from the
common difficulty of economic recession and poverty by inhibiting the inter-
state movement of poor people. The legislative thesis underlying all current
residence restrictions is that high-end welfare allowances attract poor families
from other states, that this magnet effect is undesirable because it burdens state
financial resources, and that the in-migration of needy families can and should
be curtailed by denying newcomers some or all of the public assistance avail-
able to longer term residents." 3 Beyond question, a state may validly adopt
countermeasures to forestall fiscal crises and budgetary shortfalls. But Edwards
teaches that a state may not constitutionally advance even these significant
interests by attempting to shut its gates to the interstate migration of needy
Americans. Since this is exactly the means employed by durational residence
restrictions, if not their independent goal, such laws run afoul of the
Commerce Clause as interpreted in Edwards.
It has been argued that durational residence restrictions on welfare eligibili-
ty are distinguishable from the California law struck down in Edwards in that
the latter directly prohibited interstate migration whereas welfare restrictions
177. The Court concluded that "the transportation of people is 'commerce,'" id. at 172, and that "[ilt
is immaterial whether or not the transportation is commercial in character." Id. at 172 n. 1.
178. id. at 173.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 173-75.
181. Id. at 174-75. The Court did, however, express doubts about the constitutionality of any such
discrimination. Id.; see supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text.
182. The controversies surrounding current durational residence requirements closely parallel Edwards
in a number of respects. Perhaps most notable is the fact hat state officials are presently defending length-
of-residence restriction in terms that are virtually identical to those advanced on behalf of the Califbmia
exclusion statute invalidated by Edwards.
183. See supra notes 128-44 and accompanying text.
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merely deter it.' These arguments founder both on factual and legal
grounds. First, the California statute invalidated in Edwards did not "abso-
lute[ly] exclude indigents."18 It prohibited third parties from transporting
nonresident indigents into the state, but did not proscribe the passage of poor
people across the state's borders."M To be sure, the statute was intended to
make in-migration more difficult and indeed performed that function, but
welfare waiting periods are qualitatively indistinguishable from the California
law in this respect. Although they do not flatly outlaw the passage of poor
people across state lines, they are designed to inhibit that movement. Second,
even if one viewed the California law as an "absolute" prohibition and welfare
restrictions as mere deterrents, the distinction would make no constitutional
difference. The Commerce Clause, as understood at the time of Edwards and
as currently interpreted, condemns state legislation that overtly discriminates
against the cross-border movement of people or goods, whether the discrimina-
tion impedes that traffic directly or indirectly, absolutely or partially; the Court
has repeatedly declared that it "makes no difference for purposes of Commerce
Clause analysis" whether a discriminatory state action "exclude[s]" or merely
"impose[s] additional costs upon" interstate commerce.
1 87
It has also been argued that Edwards is distinguishable because the Califor-
nia statute had as its very purpose the exclusion of indigents, whereas duration-
al residence requirements, even if they deter in-migration, ultimately aim to
reduce welfare fraud and advance other administrative interests.' The
answer to this argument is that Edwards invalidated California's exclusion
statute not merely because it pursued an illegitimate goal, but because-like
welfare restrictions, even benignly construed-it sought to achieve legitimate
184. See Comment, The Constitutionality of Residence Requirements for State Welfare Recipients, 63
Nw. U. L. REV. 351, 357 (1968); see also Appellant's Jurisdictional Statement at 7, Shapiro v. Thompson,
394 U.S. 619 (1969) (arguing that Edwards does not support invalidation of welfare residence restrictions
because the California statute was "penal" and had "permanent effect . . . on the persons aimed at");
cf. Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 282-83 (1974) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing
that the barrier to interstate travel raised by a one-year residence requirement for free non-emergency
medical care was not comparable to the barrier created by the criminal statute invalidated in Edwards).
185. Comment, supra note 184, at 357.
186. Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 169 (1941) (reargument for appellee) (construing California
statute as not "exclud[ing] any indigent person [or] ... family" but as applying only to third parties who
"without any tie of legal support to the indigent, knowingly bring, or assist in bringing, indigent persons
into the State"); id. at 171-76 (opinion of the Court analyzing the Califbrnia statute as a prohibition on the
"interstate transportation of persons").
187. New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 275-76 (1988); see also Chemical Waste Manage-
ment v. Hunt, 112 S. Ct. 2009 (1992) (voiding Alabama statute that imposed higher disposal fees on
hazardous waste generated out of state); cf Donald H. Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism:
Making Sense of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1091, 1093-94 (1986) (chronicling
demise of the "direct/indirect" distinction in negative Commerce Clause doctrine).
188. Comment, supra note 184, at 357.
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state ends through the impermissible means of restraining interstate migra-
tion.' 89 Moreover, the proponents of durational residence restrictions have
made it abundantly clear that their very purpose is to prevent poor people from
moving into the state.'"°
2. Modern Commerce Clause Analysis
Durational residence restrictions fare no better under the Court's con-
temporary Commerce Clause analysis. Indeed, the current analysis closely
resembles the framework employed in Edwards, the doctrine having remained
relatively stable over the last half-century. 9' And while the modern Court's
delineation of the negative Commerce Clause admittedly falls short of complete
precision and consistency,'92 the fundamental elements of the doctrine have
emerged with sufficient clarity for purposes of the present inquiry.
The Court has described its method of reviewing state legislation under the
Commerce Clause as a "two-tiered" approach.' 93 Facially neutral statutes
that have only an incidental impact on interstate commerce (or incidentally
disadvantage out-of-state interests) are assessed under a test that calls for
judicial balancing of the local interests against the burdens imposed upon
interstate commerce.'9 4 A facially neutral statute for these purposes is, quite
simply, one that does not by its terms discriminate against interstate commerce
or out-of-state economic interests. "' The most widely cited formulation of
the balancing test applicable to facially neutral statutes appears in Pike v. Bruce
Church, Inc.:
189. 314 U.S. at 173-74.
190. See supra notes 130-33 and accompanying text.
191. See, e.g., Eule, supra note 19; Steven G. Gey, The Political Economy of the Dormant Commerce
Clause, 17 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 1, 51 (1989-90).
192. See, e.g., Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways, 450 U.S. 662, 706 (1981) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) (critiquing the "jurisprudence of the 'negative side' of the Commerce Clause [as] hopelessly
confused").
193. E.g., Brown-Forman Distillers v. New York State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 578-79 (1986)
("This Court has adopted what amounts to a two-tiered approach to analyzing state economic regulation
under the Commerce Clause.").
194. E.g., Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (citations omitted). For an argument
that the Court only claims to engage in interest balancing, but in fact follows a categorical, "anti-protection-
ist" analysis, see Regan, supra note 187.
195. Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 117 (1978), for instance, involved a Maryland statute
that prohibited oil refiners from owning retail gasoline operations within the state. Since no oil refiners
were located in Maryland, the law had a disparate impact on out-of-state interests. Nevertheless, the statute
was considered facially neutral for Commerce Clause purposes because it classified in terms that did not
overtly refer to state origin or interstate commerce.
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Where the statute regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local public
interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be
upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in
relation to the putative local benefits .... If a legitimate local purpose is found,
then the question becomes one of degree. And the extent of the burden that will
be tolerated will of course depend on the nature of the local interest involved, and
on whether it could be promoted as well with a lesser impact on interstate activi-
ties.'
"Protectionist" statutes, on the other hand, are subject to a "virtually per
se rule of invalidity."197 A statute is "protectionist" in this sense if it overtly
discriminates against interstate commerce or out-of-state economic
interests.198 It does not matter whether this discrimination is the "ultimate
aim" of the state regulation, or simply the instrument for achieving a
legitimate, non-protectionist governmental goal. The Court has repeatedly
emphasized that "the evil of protectionism can reside in legislative means as
well as legislative ends."'99 In either event, the statute is subject to what the
Court has variously termed "the strictest scrutiny"" or a virtual per se rule
of invalidity.2 ' 1 On this branch of the analysis, the statute immediately fails,
regardless of the degree of impediment to interstate commerce, unless the state
convincingly demonstrates that its regulation is narrowly tailored to achieve
a legitimate, non-protectionist state interest. Even then, the Court will void the
statute absent a showing by the state that its interests cannot be achieved by
less discriminatory means. Not surprisingly, the survival rate under this test
borders on zero.
20 2
196. Pike, 397 U.S. at 142.
197. See, e.g., City of Phila. v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978).
198. For examples of statutes that the Court has found "protectionist" or overtly discriminatory, see,
e.g., Chemical Waste Management v. Hunt, 112 S. Ct. 2009 (1992) (voiding Alabama statute that imposed
higher disposal fees on hazardous waste generated out of state); Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 112 S. Ct. 789
(1992) (Oklahoma statute requiring coal-fired utilities to burn mixtures containing at least 10% Oklahoma
coal violates Commerce Clause); Armco Inc. v. Hardesty, 467 U.S. 638 (1984) (striking down West
Virginia wholesale gross receipts tax from which in-state manufacturers were exempt); Lewis v. BT Inv.
Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27 (1980) (holding unconstitutional Florida statute prohibiting out-of-state banks,
but not other out-of-state interests, from owning Florida investment advisory businesses).
199. Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill v. Michigan Dep't of Natural Resources, 112 S. Ct. 2019, 2024
(1992) (quoting City of Phila., 437 U.S. at 626 (1978)). This same principle was the unspoken, though
clear, basis for the decision in Edwards and a number of earlier negative Commerce Clause cases. See cases
cited in City of Phila., 437 U.S. at 626-27.
200. See, e.g., Chemical Waste Management, 112 S. Ct. at 2014 (citing Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441
U.S. 322, 337 (1979)); Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 958 (1982).
201. South-Central Timber Dev. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 100 (1984).
202. Only one statute has survived strict scrutiny under the Court's negative Commerce Clause
doctrine. In Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986), the Court upheld a Maine statute that prohibited the
importation of certain live baitfish into the state. The Court accepted fact findings by the trial judge that
"Maine's unique and fragile fisheries.., would be placed at risk by. . . parasites prevalent in out-of-state
baitfish, but not common to wild fish in Maine," and that "non-native species inadvertently included in
shipments of live baitfish" could endanger Maine's aquatic ecology. Id. at 141. The Court also accepted
fact finding that no workable tests or inspection techniques were available to screen shipments for diseased
baitfish or non-native species. Id. at 141-42. Because the out-of-state baitfish posed a unique threat to the
179
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The applicability of this analytical framework to durational residence
requifements turns upon the resolution of several preliminary issues. First is
whether -the passage of persons across state borders constitutes commerce
protected against state interference by the negative Commerce Clause. There
is no need for extended discussion on this score because an unbroken line of
cases extending from contemporary times back into the nineteenth century
answers the question resoundingly in the affirmative.2 3 One might still argue
that migration-as opposed to mere transient travel-is excluded from the ambit
of "commerce" in the relevant sense, but the Court implicitly rejected that
position in Edwards.2' Nor do the cases suggest any constitutionally relevant
distinction between the two types of interstate movement.2 5
Another threshold issue is whether the Commerce Clause reaches a state's
"police power" to design its public benefit programs, since social welfare
regulations are not "commercial" in the traditional sense. The short answer
is that the Court long ago rejected any such categorical approach to the
negative Commerce Clause in favor of a functional analysis that asks whether
a state regulation in purpose or effect, as an end or a means, interferes with
interstate commerce or discriminates against out-of-state economic
interests.2" The operative inquiry is not the subject matter of the state legis-
lation, but whether it discriminates on a basis that offends the Commerce
Clause.2' Indeed, the Court routinely sustains Commerce Clause challenges
to state legislation concerned with public health 2 ' and safety,2" natural
environment that could not be counteracted by any less discriminatory means, the Court sustained the
statute. Id. at 148 & n. 19.
203. See, e.g., United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757 (1966) ("commerce" includes the interstate
movement of persons); Edwards v. Califbrnia, 314 U.S. 160, 172 (1941) ("the transportation of persons
is 'commerce' within the meaning of [the Commerce Clause]"); Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470,
491 (1917) (movement of persons between states is "commerce"); Covington Bridge Co. v. Kentucky, 154
U.S. 204, 218 (1894) ("travel in person" across state lines is "commerce"); Gloucester Ferry Co. v.
Pennsylvania, 114 U.S. 196 (1885) ("[c]ommerce among the States ... includes the transportation of
persons"); see also Henderson v. Mayor of N.Y., 92 U.S. 259 (1875) (state statute requiring vessel owners
to post an indemnity bond for poor relief that might be provided to alien passengers violates Commerce
Clause); The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283 (1849) (state taxes on passengers arriving from
foreign ports violates Commerce Clause); cf. Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1867) (invalidating
tax on movement of people through state).
204. 314 U.S. at 172 & n.1.
205. See cases cited supra note 203; cf. Attorney Gen. v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898, 902 (1986) ("[lit
is clear that the freedom to travel includes the 'freedom to enter and abide in any State in the Union.'")
(quoting Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 338 (1972)).
206. See, e.g., TRIBE, supra note 18, at 408.
207. See Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 350 (1977) ("[A)
finding that state legislation furthers matters of legitimate local concern, even in the health and consumer
protection area, does not end the inquiry [because] [s]uch a view . . . 'would mean that the Commerce
Clause of itself imposes no limitations on state action ... save for the rare instance where a state artlessly
discloses an avowed purpose to discriminate against interstate goods.'") (quoting Dean Milk Co. v.
Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354 (1951)).
208. See, e.g., City of Phila. v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978); Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig,
Inc., 294 U.S. 511 (1935).
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resource conservation,21  state finances,1  and the environment. That
the primary subject of durational residence restrictions is also non-commercial
does not immunize it from constitutional review under the Commerce Clause.
The principal question, then, is which branch of negative Commerce Clause
analysis applies to length-of-residence restrictions on public benefit eligibility.
More specifically, it must be determined whether state welfare laws that
discriminate against recent interstate migrants are "evenhanded regulations"
to be assessed under the Pike balancing test, or "protectionist" measures
subject to the virtual per se rule of invalidity. The answer seems plain. A
central purpose of durational residence restrictions has always been to discour-
age or prevent the passage of poor people into the enacting state. 2"3 And the
proponents of recently adopted residence restrictions have repeatedly avowed
that the underlying goal is to impede the movement of poor people into their
states. 214 This, of course, is protectionism in its classic form: the attempt by
a state to "isolate itself in the stream of interstate commerce from a problem
shared by all." 215  One need not resolve whether the desire to curtail
in-migration by poor families is a state's ultimate aim or merely a means to
advance a non-protectionist state interest, such as the containment of welfare
expenditures. In either case, the intentional effort to "block the flow of inter-
state commerce at [the] State's borders"
216 triggers "the strictest scrutiny. "217
209. See, e.g., Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways, 450 U.S. 662 (1980); Raymond Motor Transp.
v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429 (1978); Hale v. Bimco Trading, 306 U.S. 375 (1939).
210. See, e.g., Sporhase v. Nebraska ex reL Douglas, 458 U.S. 941 (1982); Hughes v. Oklahoma,
441 U.S. 322 (1979).
211. See, e.g., Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941).
212. See, e.g., Chemical Waste Management v. Hunt, 112 S. Ct. 2009 (1992); Fort Gratiot Sanitary
Landfill v. Michigan Dep't of Natural Resources, 112 S. Ct. 2019 (1992); New Energy Co. v. Limbach,
486 U.S. 269 (1988).
213. See supra notes 128-33 and accompanying text. In Shapiro v. Thompson, the defendants openly
described their durational residence laws as "protective device[s]" designed to "detern]" the in-migration
of needy families. 394 U.S. 618, 627-29 (1969).
214. See supra notes 130-33 and accompanying text. Perhaps the most tempered account of legislative
purpose was advanced by the New York State Department of Social Services, which described that state's
durational residence restriction as aimed at making a poor person's decision to move to the state "fiscally
neutral." REGULATORY IMPACT STATEMENT, supra note 133. Of course, once one factors in the relatively
higher cost of living in New York, it becomes apparent that pegging welfare levels to the lower amounts
available in the applicant's prior state of residence is not "fiscally neutral" at all. Cf. Green v. Anderson,
811 F. Supp. 516, 521 (E.D. Cal. 1993) (concluding that a Califbrnia law capping newcomers' welfare
payments at the amount available in their state of origin "cannot fairly be said to provide the same payment
as new residents could have received in [their prior state] since the cost of living ... generally is much
higher in Califbrnia than elsewhere"). And even if the statute merely sought to curtail cross-border "welfare
shopping," it would still fall within the "protectionist" category because it intentionally discriminates against
interstate commerce.
215. City of Phila. v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 629 (1978).
216. South-Central Timber Dev. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 100 (1984) (quoting City ofPhila., 437
U.S. at 624).
217. This is the aspect in which negative Commerce Clause analysis more definitively condemns
durational residence requirements-and is less susceptible to judicial manipulation-than equal protection
doctrine. In equal protection analysis, if a statutory goal-here, deterring the in-migration of poor people-is
deemed constitutionally impermissible, the statute might yet be sustained if it bears a rational relationship
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One' reaches the same conclusion even without considering the many
declarations of protectionist motive made by state politicians. State legislation
that denies public benefits to new residents facially classifies on the basis of
state origin and overtly discriminates against interstate commerce (cross-border
migration) and out-of-state interests. This statutory discrimination is explicit
and intentional: poor families who have relocated from other states are for that
characteristic alone disfavored. These laws are decidedly not "evenhanded
regulations"-like highway safety rules,218 for example-that apply to all and
only incidentally impact on interstate commerce. To the contrary, length-of-
residence restrictions expressly single out recent and prospective interstate
migrants and target them for especially harsh treatment. These restrictions are
closely analogous to state statutes that impose higher taxes on articles imported
from outside the enacting jurisdiction-statutes that the Court has uniformly
invalidated as violative of the Commerce Clause.2 19 In both cases, a person
or item found in-state is disfavored solely because it originated from another
state. And, in both instances, the state law does not absolutely prohibit the
passage of persons or goods across state borders,22 but facially discriminates
against that movement in the collection or distribution of public money. If
anything is certain in negative Commerce Clause doctrine, it is that outright
discrimination of this sort draws a statute within the virtual per se rule of
invalidity, whether or not the state's ultimate objective is to impede the flow
of interstate commerce.
One might object to the foregoing analysis as too sweeping, since states
routinely classify on the basis of residence and have compelling reasons to do
so. This empirical observation is certainly accurate, and it must also be
conceded that essential sovereign attributes would all but vanish if state
governments could not condition the franchise, the right to hold high office,
to some other, legitimate state end (or, in the case of a fundamental right, if it is necessary to achieve a
compelling state interest). Compare Shapiro with Jones v. Milwaukee County, 485 N.W.2d 21 (Wis. 1992).
In a negative Commerce Clause analysis, by contrast, the consequence of a statute being found to have
as a purpose or as an intended means the inhibition of interstate migration is per se invalidity, even if the
statute might also advance some other, legitimate state interest. See, e.g., City of Phila., 437 U.S. at 624.
218. See, e.g., South Carolina State Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177 (1938); see also
Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways, 450 U.S. 662 (1980); Raymond Motor Transp. v. Rice, 434 U.S.
429 (1978).
219. See, e.g., Chemical Waste Management v. Hunt, 112 S. Ct. 2009 (1992) (invalidating as
Commerce Clause violation Alabama statute that imposed higher "disposal fee" on hazardous waste
generated outside of the state); New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269 (1988) (invalidating as
Commerce Clause violation Ohio statute denying sales tax credit to ethanol produced in other states); Armco
Inc. v. Hardesty, 467 U.S. 638 (1984) (invalidating as Commerce Clause violation West Virginia wholesale
gross receipts tax from which in-state manufacturers were exempted); Hale v. Bimco Trading, 306 U.S.
375 (1939) (invalidating as Commerce Clause violation Florida statute that imposed inspection fee on
imported, but not locally produced, cement).
220. That a state statute does not "exclude," but merely "imposes additional costs upon" interstate
commerce "makes no difference for purposes of Commerce Clause analysis." New Energy, 486 U.S. at
275-76.
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and entitlement to important public goods on bona fide state residence.221
That is why, even on a Commerce Clause analysis, the Court has recognized
that states may openly favor their own citizens in the distribution of govern-
ment largesse.222
Welfare waiting periods, however, are not bona fide residence requirements
that enable a state to limit polity-defining public goods to the state community
and thereby function "as guardian and trustee for its people. "21l Instead,
waiting periods draw distinctions among bona fide state residents and disfavor
those who have recently arrived through the flow of interstate commerce. 24
The Court has consistently emphasized this "difference between bona fide
residence requirements and durational residence requirements," noting that the
latter represents discrimination by a state against a discrete group of its own
residents. 22 Sovereignty interests of the sort advanced by true residence
requirements simply are not implicated here.
The analysis does not change if one conceives of durational residence
restrictions as aimed at, or principally disfavoring, nonresidents who would
otherwise relocate to the enacting state. Although some "distinctions between
[state] residents and nonresidents merely reflect the fact that this is a Nation
composed of individual states, and are permitted, other distinctions are pro-
hibited because they hinder the formation, the purpose or the development of
a single Union of those States. "226 Local efforts to deter American citizens
221. See, e.g., Martinez v. Bynum, 461 U.S. 321, 328 (1983) ("A bona fide state residence require-
ment [for free public schools], appropriately defined and uniformly applied, furthers the substantial state
interest in assuring that services provided for its residents are enjoyed only by [its] residents"); Zobel v.
Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 67-68 (1982) (Brennan, J., concurring) ("[A] State may make residence within
its boundaries more attractive by offering direct benefits to its citizens.... [This] inheres in the very idea
of maintaining the States as independent sovereigns within a larger framework . . . ."). See generally
William Cohen, Equal Treatment for Newcomers: The Core Meaning of National and State Citizenship,
1 CONST. COMMENTARY 9 (1984); Jonathan D. Varat, State "Citizenship" and Interstate Equality, 48
U. Cmn. L. REV. 487 (1981).
222. See, e.g., Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 441-42 (1980). In Reeves, the Court alternatively
conceptualized bona fide residence requirements for education and other core public goods as not "protec-
tionist" at all, or as "'protectionist' in a loose sense" but fully justified because "essential" to the very
"purpose of state government-to serve the citizens of the State." Id. at 442. See generally Comment, supra
note 184, at 357.
223. Reeves, 447 U.S. at 438 (quoting Heim v. McCall, 239 U.S. 175, 191 (1915) (quoting Atkin
v. Kansas, 191 U.S. 207, 222-23 (1903))).
224. States that currently impose durational requirements make no pretense that such restrictions are
necessary administrative devices to determine bona fide residence. See supra notes 130-33 and accompany-
ing text; cf Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 636 (1969) (rejecting state contention that waiting periods
rationally enhanced the administration of bona fide residence requirements). Any such argument would
be inconsistent with the structure of current state welfare restrictions which-in all but one case-accept
newcomers as bona fide residents but deny them the same level of public assistance available to longer-term
inhabitants. See supra notes 110-27 and accompanying text.
225. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 343 (1972); see also Martinez, 461 U.S. 321; Shapiro, 394
U.S. at 636.
226. Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371, 383 (1978).
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from migrating between states and establishing state residence at their point
of destination plainly fall on the impermissible side of this dichotomy.'
The remaining inquiry is whether durational residence restrictions can
survive'the close judicial scrutiny that attaches to "protectionist" legislation.
On this branch of the analysis the state bears a nearly insurmountable burden
of justification.22 Legislation that facially discriminates against "commerce
coming from outside the State" will be invalidated without further inquiry
unless the state convincingly demonstrates that "there is some reason, apart
from [its] origin, to treat [the incoming commerce] differently."229 The only
such demonstration ever found sufficient by the Court was the extensive trial
presentation made by the State of Maine, which empirically established that
baitfish from outside the state carried parasites uncommon in, but potentially
devastating to, the Maine aquatic ecosystem. 23 The Court held this to be a
valid, non-protectionist reason for discriminating against interstate commerce
because a characteristic other than the origin of the embargoed baitfish made
them a peculiar source of the environmental threat that the state legitimately
sought to avoid. T No similar showing is possible with respect to durational
residence requirements for welfare. Indeed, no state has even suggested a
neutral basis for distinguishing newly arrived poor families from any other
needy family residing in the state. To the contrary, the evidence is that the
states with durational residence restrictions have discriminated against new-
comers almost exclusively on account of recent passage across state
boundaries. 2  This is a prohibited purpose that in itself would doom the
statutes. Moreover, even if no evidence of an impermissible goal existed, the
legislative failure to articulate some non-protectionist reason for singling out
newcomers is fatal at this stage of a negative Commerce Clause analysis, since
227. This proposition is established by Edwards and a line of decisions known as the "right to travel"
cases. See, e.g., Dunn, 405 U.S. at 338 (quoting Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 285 (1970)) ("it is
clear that the freedom to travel includes the 'freedom to enter and abide in any State in the Union'"); see
also Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55 (1982); Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974).
In an oft-quoted passage that captures the solidity of this notion, Justice Stewart declared for the Court that
"[t]he constitutional right to travel from one State to another . . . occupies a position fundamental to the
concept of our Federal Union .... [T]hat right finds no explicit mention in the Constitution. The reason,
it has been suggested, is that a right so elementary was conceived from the beginning to be a necessary
concomitant of the stronger Union the Constitution created." United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757-58
(1966). So foundational was the right of citizens to interstate movement, that the Court found it constitution-
ally protected against both state and private infringement. Id. at 757-60. See also Cohen, supra note 221,
at 17 (arguing that "[olne aspect of full sovereignty denied to the states [by the Fourteenth Amendment]
is the power to determine membership in the community"). See generally Katz, supra note 29.
228. "At a minimum... facial discrimination invokes the strictest scrutiny of any purported legitimate
local purpose and of the absence of nondiscriminatory alternatives." Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322,
337 (1979).
229. City of Phila. v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 626-27 (1978).
230. Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 140-42 (1986), discussed supra note 202.
231. Id.
232. See supra notes 130-33 and accompanying text. In some states, there are racial overtones to the
reaction against poor migrants. See supra note 161.
184
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courts may neither supply legitimating rationales not advanced by the law-
makers themselves, nor consider "evidence [not] before or available to them
that might have supported their judgment.""
The one interest that every enacting state has advanced as justification for
denying new residents regular welfare benefits is cost-savings. 23 4 But even
if one ignores the objections outlined above and assumes that the states could
demonstrate the requisite "close fit" 5 between this goal and durational
residence requirements, 236 ordinary fiscal concerns fall far short of the
special justification demanded at this stage of the analysis. To begin with, the
states could not possibly prove the absence of any less discriminatory method
for achieving what they themselves have projected as a de minimis financial
benefit. 7 One can readily imagine any number of evenhanded, across-the-
board program reductions or tax increases that would address the asserted
fiscal interests not merely "as well as" durational residence restrictions, but
more efficiently than those overtly discriminatory measures? 8 Given the
near absolute fungibility of budgetary inputs and outputs, it would be difficult
not to classify durational residence restrictions as among the most discrimina-
tory fiscal reform means available to the states. Moreover, the cases strongly
suggest that financial concerns of the type here involved are categorically
insufficient to justify outright discrimination, even absent any less restrictive
alternatives. 9 Indeed, the Court reaffirmed just last Term that preservation
of the state fisc cannot constitutionally support local efforts, whether means
or ends, to inhibit interstate migration by needy families:
233. Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways, 450 U.S. 662, 680 (1981) (Brennan, J., concurring); see
also Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 338 n.20 (1979) (refusing to accept "post hoc rationalization[s]"
offered in support of state legislation that discriminates against interstate commerce).
234. See supra notes 128-44 and accompanying text.
235. See, e.g., Sporhase v. Nebraska ex reL Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 957 (1982).
236. But see supra notes 134-48 and accompanying text (discussing the near total absence of supporting
data fur state legislation imposing durational residence restrictions and the extreme administrative costs
that render such restrictions a highly inefficient method of budget reduction).
237. See supra notes 146-47 and accompanying text.
238. See supra note 148 and accompanying text (explaining excessive administrative costs associated
with and actually projected fur durational residence requirements).
239. See, e.g., City of Phila. v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 626-27 (1978) ("[Wle assume New Jersey
has every right to protect its residents' pocketbooks.... [but this] may not be accomplished by discriminat-
ing against articles of commerce coming from outside the State unless there is some reason, apart from
their origin, to treat them differently.").
Yale Law & Policy Review
No State may attempt to isolate itself from a problem common to the several
States by raising barriers to the free flow of interstate trade ...
"The Court has consistently found parochial legislation of this kind to be
constitutionally invalid, whether the ultimate aim of the legislation was to assure
a steady supply of milk by erecting barriers to allegedly ruinous outside competi-
tion; or to create jobs by keeping industry within the State; or to preserve the
State 'sfinancial resources from depletion by fencing out indigent immigrants. ",
The issues surrounding poverty in America are even more national in today's
highly interdependent welfare-state economy than when the Court observed
fifty years ago that "the relief of the needy has become the common responsi-
bility and concern of the whole nation. "241 State attempts to embargo this
national problem by discouraging the in-migration of needy Americans are
plainly unconstitutional on the prevailing interpretation of the Commerce
Clause.
The doctrinal analysis to this juncture establishes that the Commerce Clause
in its negative aspect forbids durational residence restrictions on welfare. There
remains, however, the prospect that an affirmative exercise of the commerce
power by Congress might rescue such laws from unconstitutionality. Since
1946, the Court has consistently held that Congress may authorize states to
legislate in ways that the Commerce Clause would otherwise prohibit.242 The
theory is that negative Commerce Clause doctrine merely creates a judicial
presumption that congressional silence-the commerce power in its dormant
state-signifies an intent to prohibit local interference with interstate com-
merce. Once Congress breaks silence, however, the presumption no longer
operates. And since the Constitution vests Congress with plenary power. over
interstate commerce, that power may be exercised by "permit[ting] states to
regulate . . . in a manner which would otherwise not be permissible."243
As noted above, several states have secured permission from the federal
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to deny full AFDC benefits
to needy families that have recently migrated from another state.2 " These
permissions were dispensed pursuant to Section 1115 of the Social Security
240. Chemical Waste Management v. Hunt, 112 S. Ct. 2009, 2012-13 (1992) (quoting City of Phila,
437 U.S. at 627) (internal citations and quotations omitted) (emphasis added).
241. Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 175 (1941).
242. See, e.g., Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 138 (1986); Northeast Bancorp v. Board of Governors,
472 U.S. 159, 174 (1985); South-Central Timber Dev. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 91-92 (1984); Prudential
Ins. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 425 (1946); Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761,
769 (1945) (dictum). The Prudential Insurance and Southern Pacific decisions are widely regarded as
having laid the theoretical fbundation for this doctrine, although the Court had much earlier recognized
a congressional authority to immunize state laws from Commerce Clause review. See In re Rahrer, 140
U.S. 545, 562 (1891). See generally Noel T. Dowling, Interstate Commerce and State Power-Revised
Version, 47 CoLUM. L. REV. 547 (1947).
243. Southern Pac., 325 U.S. at 769.
244. See supra notes 114, 125-26 and accompanying text. Absent HHS approval, durational residence
restrictions on AFDC benefits would violate federal law. See supra notes 103-04 and accompanying text.
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Act,245 which authorizes HHS to waive state compliance with any federal
AFDC requirement "[i]n the case of any experimental, pilot, or demonstration
project which, in the judgment of the Secretary, is likely to assist in promoting
the objectives of [the Act]. "246 An argument might therefore be made that
durational residence restrictions possessed of this federal imprimatur enjoy
immunity from any Commerce Clause objection.247 The argument would
present an issue of first impression, but the case for congressional consent
seems exceedingly weak.
The commerce power resides with Congress, not with the executive, much
less with an administrative agency.248 Since only Congress may validate state
measures that would otherwise contravene the Commerce Clause,249 the
245. 42 U.S.C. § 1315 (West 1991).
246. Id. § 1315(a).
247. Cf. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 666 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (suggesting that
Congress could empower the States to impose durational residence requirements even if such requirements
would otherwise violate the Commerce Clause).
248. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
249. The Court has uniformly required a strong showing of congressional approval before finding
validation of a state law that impedes interstate commerce. See, e.g., Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 138-
39 (1986); Northeast Bancorp v. Board of Governors, 472 U.S. 159, 174 (1985); South-Central Timber
Dev. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 91 (1984); Prudential Ins. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 430-31 (1946);
see also Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761, 769 (1945). In one case involving
the "dormant Foreign Commerce Clause," however, the Court posed the issue as whether a policy of the
"Federal Government" (not Congress in particular) immunized a state tax law from constitutional attack.
Wardair Canada, Inc. v. Florida Dep't of Revenue, 477 U.S. 1 (1986). In Wardair, a Canadian airline
challenged the application of a uniform Florida tax to the purchase of aviation fuel for its international
flights. The parties agreed that the nondiscriminatory tax would pass muster on an interstate Commerce
Clause analysis. Id. at 8-9. However, since foreign commerce was implicated, the Court required that the
tax undergo two additional inquiries, including "whether the tax prevents the Federal Government from
'speaking with one voice when regulating commercial relations with foreign governments.'" Id. at 8
(quoting Japan Line v. County of L.A., 441 U.S. 434, 451 (1979)). On the merits, the Court held that
a number of international agreements evinced a federal policy to permit the challenged state tax. Id. at 10-
12.
Notwithstanding some loose dicta to the contrary, see id. at 12, the only hope of reconciling Wardair
with the theory of the Commerce Clause established by prior and subsequent cases is to read it as a rule
that non-congressional, "federal government" approval may excuse state laws only from dormant foreign
Commerce Clause challenge, or perhaps only from the additional hurdles imposed on state laws in that
context. (The latter was the sole practical effect of "federal approval" in Wardair since the Florida tax was
unobjectionable under an ordinary interstate Commerce Clause analysis. Id. at 8-9.) This interpretation
of Wardair neatly corresponds to the underlying values that the Court has offered for its interstate and
foreign Commerce Clause doctrines. As explained below, infra notes 254-55, 293-301 and accompanying
text, the Court closely scrutinizes local laws that discriminate against interstate commerce because-among
other reasons-"[u]nrepresented interests ... often bear the brunt of [such legislation]." South-Central
Timber, 467 U.S. at 92. Congress may authorize discriminatory state laws, but the Court demands an
"unambiguous" expression of congressional intent to do so. The Court has adopted this rule to ensure that
an open, deliberate decision, arrived at "collectively" by all affected interests, has actually been made to
permit state-based discrimination. Id.; see also Taylor, 477 U.S. at 139-40. Although express consideration
and authorization by Congress may plausibly be regarded a "collective decision," unilateral action by the
Executive or its administrative agencies quite clearly may not. The analysis with respect to foreign
Commerce Clause doctrine, however, proceeds on an altogether different theory. The Court polices local
discrimination against foreign commerce not because foreign interests are unrepresented in state legislatures,
but rather because national uniformity under the aegis of the federal government is thought essential in the
international sphere. See Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 448 (quoting Board of Trustees v. United States, 289
U.S. 48, 59 (1933)) ("In international relations and with respect to foreign intercourse and trade the people
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requisite assent must be discovered, if at all, in the general waiver authority
conferred on HHS by section 1115 of the Social Security Act. This is unlikely,
though, because the Court demands unusually strong evidence before it will
conclude that Congress meant to ratify an otherwise unconstitutional state law.
Indeed, the ordinary rules of statutory analysis do not apply in this context.
Rather, "for a state regulation to be removed from the reach of the dormant
Commerce Clause, congressional intent must be unmistakably clear. "250 It
is not enough that the state law be consistent with or even advance a "parallel
federal policy." 25 Nor will intent on a specific matter be inferred from
general legislation. Congress must "affirmatively contemplate otherwise invalid
state legislation" for assent to be found.52
The stringency of these rules derives from the democratic governance value
of the Commerce Clause. As the Court explains it, one reason for disfavoring
protectionist or discriminatory measures is that they frequently disadvantage
interests unrepresented in the enacting state's political process. 3  When
Congress authorizes discriminatory state legislation, by contrast, the decision
is a "collective" one in which "all segments of the country are represent-
ed. "I' The Court's insistence upon the clearest evidence of congressional
authorization is said to minimize the risk of adverse action against unrepre-
of the United States act through a single government with unified and adequate national power."). Since
the paradigm here is "single national voice," not "collective decisionmaking," even non-congressional
approval of state laws by the federal government might be accepted as consistent with the theory and policy
concerns underlying the fbreign Commerce Clause doctrine.
250. South-Central Tnber, 467 U.S. at 91 (emphasis added); see, e.g., Taylor, 477 U.S. at 139 ("An
unambiguous indication of congressional intent is required before a federal statute will be read to authorize
otherwise invalid state legislation, regardless of whether the purported authorization takes the fbrm of a
flat exemption from Commerce Clause scrutiny or the less direct form of a reduction in the level of
scrutiny."); TRIE, supra note 18, at 525 (the Court will "examine federal legislation carefully before
upholding a [protectionist] state law"). The principle that Congress must speak with special clarity and
directness to alter the usual distribution of governmental powers has emerged in a number of constitutional
settings. See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 111 S. Ct. 2395, 2401 (1991) (holding that application of federal
Age Discrimination in Employment Act to a state law mandating retirement of judges at age 70 would
.upset the usual constitutional balance of federal and state powers," and therefore required an "unmistak-
ably clear" textual expression of congressional intent) (internal quotations omitted); Will v. Michigan Dep't
of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 65 (1989) (holding that states may not be sued under the Civil Rights Act
of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, because statute does not contain "unmistakably clear" language subjecting
states to liability) (internal quotations omitted); Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242
(1985) (holding that Congress must make its intention to abrogate states' Eleventh Amendment immunity
"unmistakably clear in the language of the statute"); cf. United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349 (1971)
("In traditionally sensitive areas, such as legislation affecting the federal balance, the requirement of clear
statement ensures that the legislature has in fact faced, and intended to bring into issue, the critical matters
involved in the judicial decision.").
251. South-Central Timber, 467 U.S. at 91.
252. Id. at 91-92.
253. See infra notes 293-301 and accompanying text.
254. South-Central Timber Dev. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 92 (1984).
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sented interests by ensuring that the national political process has in fact
generated a collective decision."
It would appear beyond dispute that, by these standards, Congress's broad
and nonspecific delegation of waiver authority to HHS falls short of immuniz-
ing state durational residence restrictions from constitutional review. Section
1115 itself rules out any credible argument for "unmistakably clear intent" or
open and deliberate approval by the national political process. The terms of
the statute yield no hint that Congress affirmatively contemplated the authoriza-
tion of durational residence restrictions or of any other measure that would
otherwise violate the Commerce Clause. To the contrary, section 1115 eschews
specifics in favor of vesting HHS with discretion to approve a nearly limitless
and unforeseeable variety of demonstration projects that a state might develop
and propose. 6 A deliberate and collective decision to authorize what
amounts to discrimination against residents from relatively low-benefit states
is anything but apparent in section 11 15. There is no evidence that Congress
"affirmatively contemplate[d]" authorization of durational residence restrictions
that would otherwise violate the Constitution. Nor, obviously, could the
procedure established by section 1115-a bilateral exchange involving officials
from the petitioning state and bureaucrats from HHS" 7-claim the mantle
of "collective decisionmaking," even if agency action could under any circum-
stances authorize state measures violative of the Commerce Clause.5
255. Id.; see also Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 139 (1986) (quoting South-Central imber, 467
U.S. at 92) ("Absent a 'clear expression of approval by Congress,' any relaxation in the restrictions on
state power otherwise imposed by the Commerce Clause unacceptably increases 'the risk that unrepresented
interests will be adversely affected by restraints on commerce.'").
256. See 42 U.S.C. § 1315(a)(1) (1991) ("[Tlhe Secretary may waive compliance with any of the
[relevant federal] requirements ... to the extent and for the period he finds necessary to enable such State
or States to carry out [a proposed demonstration] project .. .).
257. See § 1315(b)(3) (1991). The statute does require that states seeking approval for a demonstration
project "issue a public notice" of their proposal and "invite comment," but it neither specifies the nature
of the public notice, nor, apparently, requires publication outside of the petitioning state. § 1315(b)(3)(A).
258. Although section 1115 authorizations quite clearly fail to save state durational residence
restrictions in the AFDC program, it remains true that the Achilles' heel of any negative Commerce Clause
claim is its apparent susceptibility to displacement by future, simple-majority legislation. See Prudential
Ins. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408 (1946) (suggesting that Congress possesses unrestricted power to authorize
state "regulation" of interstate commerce). And while the modem Court has apparently disclaimed any
judicial role in defining Congress' affirmative commerce power, but see New York v. United States, 112
S. Ct. 2408 (1992) (holding that Congress exercises its conferred power subject to constitutional con-
straints), one might nevertheless construct an argument that discrimination against interstate migration by
needy Americans treads too heavily on core Commerce Clause interests to be permitted even upon
congressional authorization. Cf Andrzej Rapaczynski, From Sovereignty to Process: The Jurisprudence
of Federalism After Garcia, 1985 SUP. CT. REV. 341 (advocating as limit on Congress' power under
positive Commerce Clause "a jurisprudence... aimed at preserving and enhancing the national political
process. ").
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IV. WELFARE RESTRICTIONS AND THE UNDERLYING VALUES
OF THE COMMERCE CLAUSE
The previous Part demonstrated that established Commerce Clause doctrine
provides a constitutional check against durational residence restrictions on
welfare. This Part carries the analysis further, arguing that state efforts to deter
cross-border migration by poor people also offend the principal values
underlying the Commerce Clause. From early on, the Court has recognized
that while the Commerce Clause has as its stated purpose the regulation of
commerce, the mission of the provision is far broader. 9 Over the years,
three discernible values have emerged as justifications for judicial development
and enforcement of the extra-textual negative Commerce Clause: free trade,
national union, and democratic governance. Scholars have vigorously debated
the relative merits of these approaches, both in terms of descriptive accuracy
and normative attractiveness. 20 The purpose of the discussion that follows
is not to enter this debate, but rather to show that discriminatory state welfare
policies undermine each of the values that courts and commentators associate
with the negative Commerce Clause.
A. Free Trade Value
One value said to animate negative Commerce Clause doctrine is the
advancement of "free trade" among the states of the union. 21 The Court has
long suggested that "[t]he very purpose of the Commerce Clause was to create
259. See, e.g., Welton v. Missouri, 91 U.S. 275, 280 (1876) (noting that while commerce power most
directly speaks to matters commercial, "[t]he very object of investing this power in the [National]
Government" is larger end of eradicating "discriminating State legislation").
260. For a concise description of the current debate and competing schools of thought on the negative
Commerce Clause, see TRIBE, supra note 18, at 402 & n.6.
261. A number of commentators have critiqued the free trade theory both on a descriptive and
normative level. They point out that the Commerce Clause nowhere expresses a substantive preference for
"free trade" as opposed to regulated markets, but merely centralizes the power "to regulate commerce...
among the States" in the national government. See, e.g., Thomas K. Anson & P.M. Schenkkan, Federal-
ism, the Dormant Commerce Clause, and State-Owned Resources, 59 TEX. L. REv. 71, 78-80 (1980)
(questioning assumptions about Commerce Clause's commitment to free trade as opposed to regulated
markets); Eule, supra note 19, at 430 (arguing that the Constitution "did not attempt to solve economic
parochialism by an express prohibition against interference with free trade"). Others have linked the "free
trade" interpretation of the Commerce Clause to the judicial advancement of laissez faire economic theory
in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. See Gey, supra note 191; H. P. Hood & Sons v. Du
Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 562-63 (1949) (Black, J., dissenting) ("The judicially directed march of the due
process philosophy as an emancipator of business from regulation appeared arrested a few years ago. That
appearance was illusory . . .The due process clause and commerce clause have been used like Siamese
twins in a never-ending stream of challenges to government regulation. .... ").
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an area of free trade among the several States"262 so that the Nation would
comprise a "federal free trade unit."26" Some commentators contend that the
federal convention of 1787 was called principally to address the issue of state
interference with free trade.2 And the substantive value of free trade has
been a persistent theme in the Commerce Clause case law.265
The classic statement of the free trade theory appears in Justice Jackson's
majority opinion in H.P. Hood & Sons v. Du Mond:
Our system, fostered by the Commerce Clause, is that every farmer and every
craftsman shall be encouraged to produce by the certainty that he will have free
access to every market in the Nation, that no home embargoes will withhold his
exports, and no foreign state will by customs duties or regulations exclude them.
Likewise, every consumer may look to the free competition from every producing
area in the Nation to protect him from exploitation by any. Such was the vision
of the Founders; such has been the doctrine of this Court which has given it
reality.'
Embedded in this theory is the notion that local interference with "free market"
allocation prevents the most productive deployment of resources and generates
inefficiencies that reverberate throughout the economy.267 As elaborated by
the Court, this "free trade" value of the Commerce Clause has come to
262. McLeod v. J.E. Dilworth Co., 322 U.S. 327, 330 (1944); see also Freeman v. Hewitt, 329 U.S.
249, 252 (1946) (purpose of Commerce Clause was to "creat[e] an area of trade free from interference
by the States"); Wabash, St. L. & Pac. Ry. v. Illinois, 118 U.S. 557, 573 (1886) (arguing that "the entire
freedom of commerce among the States" was "deemed essential to a more perfect union by the framers
of the Constitution").
263. H. P. Hood, 336 U.S. at 538. See generally Ernest J. Brown, The Open Economy: Justice
Frankfurter and the Position of the Judiciary, 67 YALE L.J. 219 (1957); Bernard Schwartz, Commerce,
the States, and the Burger Court, 74 Nw. U. L. REV. 409, 411 (1979); Robert A. Sedler, The Negative
Commerce Clause as a Restriction on State Regulation and Taxation: An Analysis in Terms of Constitutional
Structure, 31 WAYNE L. REV. 885, 986 (1985).
264. See, e.g., Eule, supra note 19, at 435 ("the Constitutional Convention was prompted by
commercial protectionism"); FRANKFURTER, supra note 34, at 13 (the federal convention sought principally
to "remove those commercial obstructions and harassments to which the militant new free states subjected
one another."); Sedler, supra note 263, at 993 ("It was a widely held belief at the time of the adoption
of the Constitution that the Articles of Confederation had failed, in large part, because the states had waged
destructive trade wars against one another."). But see Edmund W. Kitch, Regulation and the American
Common Market, in REGULATION, FEDERALISM AND INTERSTATE COMMERCE 9-19 (A. Dan Tarlock ed.,
1981) (arguing that the Confederation was an economic success).
265. See, e.g., Sedler, supra note 263, at 982-83 and cases there collected; see also Kassel v.
Consolidated Freightways, 450 U.S. 662, 669 (1981) ("The Clause requires that some aspects of tradegenerally must remain free from interference by the States."); Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising
Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 350 (1977) (adverting to "the Commerce Clause's overriding requirement of a
national 'common market'"). Early expositions of the theory appear in Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53
U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851), and in The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283 (1849).
266. H. P. Hood & Sons v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 539 (1949). For an argument that Justice
Jackson's formulation establishes not a "free trade" principle, but a "nondiscrimination" principle, see
Sedler, supra note 263, at 983-84.
267. See, e.g., Regan, supra note 187, at 1118; see also THE FEDERALIST No. 12 (Alexander
Hamilton) (arguing that eliminating state trade barriers would permit more efficient development of
agriculture and industry).
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encompass an "anti-protectionist" principle, a "free location" principle, and
a general "market efficiency" principle. These three currents of thought
overlap in significant respects. The anti-protectionist command forbids state
action "designed to benefit in-state economic interests by burdening out-of-state
competitors."26 The free location tenet condemns state laws that interfere
with economic actors' freedom "to choose the state where various conditions
give them a competitive advantage in the national marketplace. "269 Intersect-
ing both these approaches is the "market efficiency" principle, which disap-
proves local interference with "the natural functioning of the interstate
market"270 and its free allocation of economic factors, at least absent some
sufficiently weighty countervailing benefit.27'
Durational residence restrictions on public assistance are inconsistent with
each of these free trade principles. As discussed earlier, states impose. such
restrictions in order to inhibit the free movement of low-income citizens across
state borders. This type of legislation presents a pure form of prohibited
"protectionism" because it seeks to externalize costs by insulating the enacting
state against the perceived ills of the national economy. Length-of-residence
requirements also violate the principle of free location, which reaches persons
as well as goods and capital.272 It has long been recognized that settlement
laws and related restrictions on relief have prevented the free movement of
labor to where it might most advantageously be employed.273 Finally,
268. New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 273 (1988); see, e.g., Bacchus Imports v. Dias,
468 U.S. 263 (1984) (invalidating Hawaii statute that exempted from state liquor tax fruit wines manufac-
tured in the State from products grown in the State); Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511 (1935)
(invalidating New York law that prohibited importation of milk purchased out-of-state for less than New
York state-mandated price); Regan, supra note 187, at 1095 (defining prohibited "protectionism" under
a free trade theory as state efforts to put local actors in a better competitive situation).
269. See Sedler, supra note 263, at 985; Earl Maltz, How Much Regulation is Too Much-
An Examination of Commerce Clause Jurisprudence, 50 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 47 (1981); see also South-
Central Timber Dev. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82 (1984) (invalidating Alaska's attempt to require that timber
taken from state lands be processed in state before export); Lewis v. BT Inv. Managers, Inc., 447 U.S.
27 (1980) (invalidating Florida law that prohibited out-of-state banks from offering investment advisory
services in Florida); Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970) (invalidating order of Arizona
official requiring cantaloupe producers to locate packing operations within the state); Foster-Fountain
Packing v. Haydel, 278 U.S. 1 (1928) (invalidating Louisiana law that prohibited the export of shrimp
unless heads and hulls had been removed in state).
270. See Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 117, 127 (1978) (quoting Hughes v. Alexandria
Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 806 (1976)).
271. See, e.g., Richard B. Collins, Economic Union as a Constitutional Value, 63 N.Y.U. L. Rev.
43, 63 (1988); Frank Easterbrook, Antitrust and the Economics of Federalism, 26 J.L. & Econ. 23, 45-46
(1983); David Pomper, Recycling Philadelphia v. New Jersey: The Dormant Commerce Clause, Post-
Industrial 'Natural' Resources and the Solid Waste Crisis, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1309, 1314; RICHARD A.
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 509-524 (1977).
272. See, e.g., Collins, supra note 271, at 60 ("[a] common market requires reasonable mobility of
goods and people across interior borders").
273. Franklin D. Roosevelt, upon signing the Social Security Act, inveighed against durational
residence requirements, arguing that such measures inhibited the free migration of workers. See Shapiro
v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 640 n.24 (1969); see also PIVEN & CLOWARD, supra note 2, at 144 n.30
(discussing the English Act of 1795, which relaxed existing settlement restrictions to free the movement
of laborers); Rosenheim, supra note 134, at 310 (quoting 6 HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW
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durational residence restrictions generate a variety of social and market ineffi-
ciencies. Richard Posner has observed that the absence of nationally mandated
welfare rules invites states to export poverty either by setting benefits at very
low levels or by attempting to exclude the poor with length-of-residence
requirements." The latter strategy, Posner notes, distorts the labor market
and impedes the efficient deployment of resources by "discourag[ing] the
migration of ... poor famil[ies] that [are] motivated by superior [employment]
opportunities in the high welfare state."275
B. National Unity Value
The second value associated with the Commerce Clause is national union.
This value also traces its origins to the early days of the Republic and the
framing of the Constitution.276 In contrast with the free trade interpretation,
the "political union" theory of the Commerce Clause identifies the central
concern as "ensur[ing] national solidarity, not economic efficiency. " '
Protectionist state laws are inconsistent with this value because they encourage
destructive interstate "rivalries and retaliations" and thereby threaten national
cohesion.2 78 Internal barriers to trade are disallowed, not because they distort
the market, but because they are irreconcilable with the very idea of nation-
hood. As Justice Cardozo most memorably put it, the Constitution forbids
parochial legislation "upon the theory that the peoples of the several states
352 (1924)) (relating view that settlement and residence requirements in the English poor laws interfered
with free trade and "the growth of the capitalistic organization of industry").
274. POSNER, supra note 271, at 519-21.
275. Id. Posner also argues that inefficiencies arise when states set benefits levels very low because
this may "discourag[e] indigents in high welfare benefit states from seeking employment in other areas."
Id. at 521 n.2; cf MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE 37 (1983) ("The same writers who defended
free trade in the nineteenth century also defended unrestricted immigration.... In their view, as Henry
Sidgwick reported it in the 1890s, the only business of state officials is 'to maintain order over [a] particular
territory ... but not in any way to determine who is to inhabit this territory, or to restrict the enjoyment
of its natural advantages to any particular portion of the human race.'").
276. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST Nos. 6-9, 11 (Alexander Hamilton). In this regard, it has been
suggested that Chief Justice Marshall developed the Commerce Clause in its negative aspect "to realize
James Wilson's goal of '[blurying all local interests and distinctions' in order to become 'one nation of
brethren.'" See Gey, supra note 191, at 6; 1 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 166-67
(Max Farrand ed., 1937).
277. TRIBE, supra note 18, at 417.
278. See Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 522-23 (1935).
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must sink or swim together, and that in the long run prosperity and salvation
are in union and not division. "279 "To give entrance to" state protectionism,
he warned, "would be to invite a speedy end to our national solidarity."28°
The modern Court has frequently adverted to political union as the central
value promoted by judicial enforcement of the negative Commerce Clause.2"'
This ideal of national unity assumes special force and value during times of
national crisis or periods of economic downturns, as states attempt to secede
from problems of national scope. 282 Legislation that openly and unabashedly
discriminates against out-of-state interests poses the sharpest threat to interstate
harmony and so has most often been held to be inconsistent with the
Commerce Clause concept of union.283
Durational residence restrictions on welfare undermine the goal of national
solidarity in at least three respects. First, they abort the possibility of a national
response to poverty in favor of a beggar-thy-neighbor approach that seeks to
export the problem instead of solve it.284 Second, durational residence restric-
tions provoke internecine rivalries and destructive competition among the
states. The adoption of such restrictions by even one or two states invariably
triggers a chain reaction, causing other states to erect similar barriers for fear
of becoming the only non-forbidden destination for the country's poor.285
And the political discourse surrounding these laws is rife with hostile cross-
279. Id. Justice Frankfurter described this theory of the negative Commerce Clause as proceeding on
the premise that "State authority must be subject to such limitations as the Court finds it necessary to apply
for the protection of the national community." FRANKFURTER, supra note 34, at 18-19. Justice Holmes
described the rationale for judicial enforcement of the negative Commerce Clause in similar terms: "I do
not think that the United States would come to an end if we lost our power to declare an Act of Congress
void. I do think that the Union would be imperiled if we could not make that declaration as to the laws
of the several States. For one in my place sees how often local policy prevails with those who are not
trained to national views and how often action is taken that embodies what the Commerce Clause was meant
to end." OLIVER W. HOLMES, Law and the Court, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 295-96 (1920).
280. Baldwin, 294 U.S. at 523.
281. See, e.g., H. P. Hood & Sons v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 533-35 (1949) ("[the] Court has
advanced the solidarity and prosperity of this Nation by the meaning it has given to [the commerce clause
in its dormant state]"); Duckworth v. Arkansas, 314 U.S. 390, (1941); Baldwin, 294 U.S. at 522-23.
282. See Sedler, supra note 263, at 886-87.
283. See TRIBE, supra note 18, at 417 (arguing that Court's pattern of tolerating discriminatory effects,
even of large magnitude, but refusing to tolerate outright, facial discrimination, even if trivial, proves that
main values animating the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine are interstate harmony and national unity).
284. Cf Taylor, supra note 3.
285. This dynamic was apparent from the prevalence of interstate reciprocal exemption agreements
in pre-Shapiro durational residence statutes. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 635 & n. 15 (1969)
(noting that both state defendants had "entered into open-ended interstate compacts" that waived the one-
year ineligibility period for anyone migrating from another participating state); see also Great Ati. & Pac.
Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366, 379-81 (1976) (holding that state barriers to commerce with waivers
under reciprocity agreements cannot be justified as response to or countermeasure against protectionist
legislation by other states); cf Katz, supra note 29, at 148-49 (recounting that when populist governor
Lorenzo D. Lewelling declared unconstitutional the State of Kansas' vagrancy laws, "[olne observer
reported that tramps were flocking to Kansas from across the country and increasing the crime rate").
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border fingerpointing and invective.286 Lastly, and most importantly, the
proliferation of state laws designed to restrain the interstate movement of
American citizens is antithetical to the very concept of nationhood. 2 7 Justice
Douglas, though not a supporter of projecting the Commerce Clause into any
area touching upon human rights,288 cautioned that to permit state restrictions
on interstate migration by poor people "would be to contravene every concep-
tion of national unity. "289 In this same vein, the Court has repeatedly asserted
that a constitutional right to interstate travel inheres in and is "fundamental"
to "the concept of our Federal Union, "290 and that state discrimination
against its newer residents "conflicts with the constitutional purpose of main-
taining a Union rather than a mere 'league of States.' "291 Finally, whether
one conceives of durational residence restrictions as an attempt to fence out
needy Americans from other states or as the relegation of poor newcomers to
a de jure subordinate caste, such legislation strikes at the heart of national
union by rejecting one of its irreducible attributes: the concept of national
citizenship.292
286. See supra notes 130-33, 162 and accompanying text. California's defense of its exclusion statute
in Edwards most vividly exemplifies the genre:
States that have so long tolerated, and even fostered, the social conditions that have reduced these
people to their state of poverty and wretchedness [should not] be able to get rid of them by low
relief and insignificant welfare allowances and drive them to become our public charges at our
immeasurably higher standard of social services. . . . Naturally, when these people can live on
relief in California better than they can by working in Mississippi, Arkansas, Texas or Oklahoma,
they will continue to come to this State.
Edwards v. Califbrnia, 314 U.S. 160, 168 (1941) (argument for appellee); see also Thompson v. Shapiro,
270 F. Supp. 331, 341 (D. Conn. 1967) (dissent) (arguing that absent the "deterrent" of a durational
residence restriction, Connecticut would become a "refuge for welfare recipients of other states" who
"might be encouraged or even assisted" to migrate to Connecticut by officials of other states).
287. See CHARLES BLACK, STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 28-29 (1969)
(arguing that "internal barriers to travel are unthinkable" if national unity is to prevail).
288. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
289. Edwards, 314 U.S. at 181 (Douglas, J., concurring). Professor Regan may be correct in asserting
that "when states distribute benefits, they can prefer their own citizens" without seriously offending "the
concept of union." Regan, supra note 187, at 1194. But, as discussed earlier, supra notes 221-24 and
accompanying text, durational residence restrictions are not citizen preference measures in this sense. See,
e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 334, 337 & n.7, 338-43, 350-52 (1972) (emphasizing the critical
constitutional distinction between bona fide state residence requirements and durational residence restric-
tions). To the contrary, such restrictions deeply offend the concept of union by attempting to deny poor
people from other parts of the country the opportunity to affiliate with the enacting state's polity and
become full citizens of the community.
290. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 630 (1969) (quoting United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745,
757-58 (1966)).
291. Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 72-73 (1982) (O'Connor, J., concurring); see Paul v. Virginia,
75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 180 (1869) ("[W]ithout some provision of the kind removing from the citizens of
each State the disabilities of alienage in the other States, and giving them equality of privilege with citizens
of those States, the Republic would have constituted little more than a league of States; it would not have
constituted the Union which now exists . . .).
292. See Edwards v. Califbrnia, 314 U.S. 160, 183 (1941) (Jackson, J., concurring) ("[lit is a
privilege of citizenship of the United States, protected from state abridgment, to enter any state of the
Union, either for temporary sojourn or for the establishment of permanent residence therein and for gaining
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C. Democratic Legitimacy Value
A third value underlying negative Commerce Clause doctrine is democratic
governance. An issue of democratic legitimacy arises whenever a state regula-
tion discriminates against out-of-state interests. In such cases, the state imposes
a disproportionate burden upon those who have neither voice nor representation
in the state legislative process and are powerless to hold decision-makers
politically accountable.293 Close judicial scrutiny under the Commerce Clause
has often been rationalized as a necessary corrective and check upon this
undemocratic latency in our federal system.294 Justice Stone introduced this
theory of the Commerce Clause295-which exemplifies a process-based,
representation reinforcement approach to constitutional review296-in South
Carolina State Highway Dept. v. Barnwell Bros.:
State regulations affecting interstate commerce, whose purpose or effect is [to
discriminate against outside interests] have been thought to impinge upon the
constitutional prohibition [imposed by the negative Commerce Clause].
resultant citizenship thereof. If national citizenship means less than this, it means nothing."); The Slaughter-
House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 80 (1873) ("[A] citizen of the United States can, of his own volition,
become a citizen of any State of the Union by a bona fide residence therein, with the same rights as other
citizens of that State."). See generally Varat, supra note 221.
293. Some have argued that a similar problem arises even with nondiscriminatory state laws that act
upon outsiders, since the state in such instances effectively exercises sovereignty without the consent of
the governed. See, e.g., Lea Brilmayer, Carolene, Conflicts, and the Fate of the 'Inside-Outsider,' 134
U. PA. L. REV. 1291 (1986). Despite this perceived difficulty, evenhanded state laws have been tolerated
on the theory that the affected in-state constituencies will provide an adequate check against political abuse
and "virtually represent" similarly situated out-of-state interests. See, e.g., South Carolina State Highway
Dep't v. Barnwell, 303 U.S. 177, 187 (1938) ("The fact that [the regulations] affect alike shippers in
interstate and intrastate commerce in large number within as well as without the state is a safeguard against
their abuse."); see also Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery, 449 U.S. 456, 473 n.17 (1981) ("The
existence of major in-state interests adversely affected by the Act is a powerful safeguard against legislative
abuse.").
294. See, e.g., Eule, supra note 19, at 445; Tushnet, supra note 20, at 128-29; see also TRIBE, supra
note 18, at 411 (contending that the dormant Commerce Clause proceeds on the "premises that unaccount-
able power is to be carefully scrutinized and that legislators are accountable only to those who have the
power to vote them out of office").
295. The doctrinal fbrebear of this approach to the Commerce Clause is McCulloch v. Maryland, 17
U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 435-36 (1819), where the Court invalidated a state tax on a federal instrumentality,
in part on the theory that the state legislative process did not represent, and could not be expected
adequately to attend to, the national interests affected.
296. See generally JOHN H. ELY, DEMOCRAcY AND DISTRUST (1980).
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Underlying the stated rule has been the thought, often expressed in judicial
opinion, that when the regulation is of such a character that its burden falls
principally upon those without the state, legislative action is not likely to be
subjected to those political restraints which are normally exerted on legislation
where it affects adversely some interests within the state.2
The Court has repeatedly returned to this "process perfecting" rationale
for vigilant judicial enforcement of the Commerce Clause against state legisla-
tion.298 In advancing this value, the Court focuses "on a question of political
procedure rather than economic substance: whether the burden of the legisla-
tion falls on groups too weak politically to participate in the battle of interest
groups."2' A number of commentators have embraced this democratic-
structural approach to the Commerce Clause, some on the view that "[t]he
contemporary dangers of state parochialism lie in its evisceration of the
democratic process, not in its impairment of free trade,"" others because
the approach strikes them as most consistent with proper judicial respect for
majoritarian decisionmaking and the "realities of national politics."301
State laws that deny or reduce subsistence benefits to newcomers are prime
candidates for judicial invalidation on a democratic process theory of the
Commerce Clause. Poor people are among the most politically marginalized
and defenseless constituencies in America. In a nation where political and
economic power converge, the "democratic process" operates less than demo-
cratically with respect to the have-nots, even within their own states."a State
discrimination against a class of poor out-of-staters, therefore, casts the issue
297. 303 U.S. at 185 n.2 (1938) (citations omitted). Justice Stone's process-based formulation of
Commerce Clause doctrine in Barnwell presaged the language and theoretical framework that he employed
several months later in the renowned footnote fbur of United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144,
152 n.4 (1938) ("[Plrejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends
seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect
minorities, and ... may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.").
298. See, e.g., Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 139 (1986) ("any relaxation in the restrictions on state
power otherwise imposed by the Commerce Clause unacceptably increases 'the risk that unrepresented
interests will be adversely affected by restraints on commerce.'") (quoting South-Central Timber Dev. v.
Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 92 (1984)); Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona ex rel Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761, 767-68,
n.2 (1945) ("[T]o the extent that the burden of state regulation falls on interests outside the state, it is
unlikely to be alleviated by the operation of those political restraints normally exerted when interests within
the state are affected."); see also Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways, 450 U.S. 662, 676 (1981); Hunt
v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333 (1979); Raymond Motor Transp. v. Rice,
434 U.S. 429, 444 n.18, 447 (1978).
299. Anson & Schenkkan, supra note 261, at 83; see also Dowling, supra note 242, at 15-19; Eule,
supra note 19, at 445; Redish & Nugent, supra note 166, at 612; TRIBE, supra note 18, at 402; Tushnet,
supra note 20, at 132-33. The democratic value of the Commerce Clause has also been associated with
substantive features. See, e.g., Walter Hellerstein, State Taxation and the Supreme Court: Toward A More
Unified Approach to Constitutional Adjudication, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1427, 1446-52 (1977); Sedler, supra
note 263, at 893. But see Collins, supra note 271, at 46; 110-29.
300. Eule, supra note 19, at 428.
301. Tushnet, supra note 20, at 164-65; see also ELY, supra note 296, at 82-83. For a critique of
the democratic process theory of the negative Commerce Clause, see, e.g., Regan supra note 187, at 1160-
67.
302. See supra notes 149-61 and accompanying text. See generally Loffredo, supra note 27.
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of democratic illegitimacy in particularly high relief.33 As the Edwards
Court concluded in a similar context, discrimination of this sort calls forth
strict judicial supervision because "the indigent non-residents who are the real
victims . . . are deprived of the opportunity to exert political pressure upon
the [state] legislature in order to obtain a change in policy."
3 4
Durational residence restrictions raise especially acute democratic process
concerns for yet another reason. In the run-of-the-mill Commerce Clause case,
in-state consumers who face higher prices as a result of protectionist
commercial legislation share interests with and may "virtually represent" the
out-of-state business competitors targeted by such laws.30 5 Moreover, those
out-of-state interests, though not formally enfranchised, frequently wield
considerable political clout, locally and/or in Congress .3' Despite the
presence of these ameliorating factors, the Court routinely strikes down
discriminatory legislation with reference to the democratic theory of the
Commerce Clause. The victims of welfare residence restrictions do not enjoy
even these ordinary buffers against legislative abuse. No politically effective
in-state constituency "virtually represents" the impoverished targets of such
restrictions. 37 Nor does this dispossessed minority command the political
resources necessary to secure legislative change at the state or national
level. 3" Not surprisingly, the absence of poor people's voices has
engendered a political discourse virtually devoid of empirical foundation and
driven instead by arbitrary and stereotypical perceptions of the poor. 3°9
Where, as here, the disadvantaged out-group has no power to enforce political
303. Durational residence restrictions burden two classes of people: low-income residents from out-of-
state who are deterred from migrating, and needy people who have recently arrived from other states and
are denied the public benefits available to longer-term residents. Both classes are politically disenfranchised
in the enacting state: the first because of nonresidence, the second because of economic status and because
the vast majority of its members will age out of the disadvantaged category (current restrictions range from
60 days to one year) before the next election.
304. Edwards v. Califbrnia, 314 U.S. 160, 174 (1941) (citations omitted).
305. But see Tushnet, supra note 20, at 132-33 (arguing caution in considering diffuse consumer
interests as an effective political check against protectionist legislation).
306. See, e.g., MARK TUSHNET, RED, WHITE, AND BLUE: A CRrrICAL ANALYSIS OF CONSTrrIUTIONAL
LAW 79-83 (1988).
307. As noted above, the class composed of poor people who relocate to a restricted state and suffer
under durational residence requirements is too fluid and transitory to become an effective constituency,
even if the economic status of that class did not itself rule out effective political action.
308. See, e.g., Edelman, supra note 16, at 2 (discussing "the poor's continuing political powerless-
ness"); cf ROBERT DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITs CRITIcs 114-15 (1989) (noting the "familiar fact" that
political power is a function of access to money and related resources that are unequally distributed).
309. See supra notes 149-61 and accompanying text.
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accountability, a critical incentive for considered and informed decisionmaking
dissolves.31 The democratic theory of the Commerce Clause arose to coun-
teract this feature of the political process.
V. CONCLUSION:
THE COMMERCE CLAUSE AS A SOURCE OF COMMUNITY
An important question facing courts and commentators today is how to
"recogni[ze]"31 America in order to forge a more inclusive sense of national
identity, one that extends membership to groups and persons historically
excluded from the life of the community." 2 Because membership in the
national community has become a constitutive element of political identity,
exclusion poses significant barriers to participation in public life.313 A
Commerce Clause analysis of welfare restrictions provides an important
perspective on this central issue of American society. The clause has historical-
ly allowed the Court to act as a catalyst in a national dialogue about how the
community has been, or ought to be, defined. In its best moments, the clause
has been sensitive to local concerns,31 4 while at the same time fostering senti-
ments of nationwide scope and encouraging an ethos of national community.
The Court's elaboration of Commerce Clause doctrine, like the definition
of community itself, holds importance for both society and the individual.3 5
Justice Stone, the principal architect of modern Commerce Clause doctrine,
once remarked that "the Commerce Clause and the wise interpretation of it,
perhaps more than any other contributing element, have united to bind the
several states into a nation."316 In its national aspirations, though, the clause
reaches beyond the establishment of a union of states to the creation of a
community of people. The national solidarity often extolled in the Court's
310. Two decades ago, Justice Marshall noted the prevalence of this dynamic in the context of
restrictive or punitive welfare legislation, observing that "[blecause the recipients of public assistance
generally lack substantial political influence, state legislators may find it expedient to accede to pressures
generated by misconceptions." New York State Dep't of Social Servs. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 432
(1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
311. Frank Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493, 1495 (1988).
312. Frank Michelman, for example, speaks of the need to "extend political community to persons
in our midst who have as yet no stakes in 'our' past because they had no access to it." Id. Kenneth Karst
asks simply: "Who belongs to America?" KARST, supra note 24.
313. See WALZER, supra note 275, at 31-32; Drucilla Cornell, Toward a Modern/Post Reconstruction
of Ethics, 133 U. PA. L. REv. 291 (1985).
314. See, e.g., Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp. 426 U.S. 794, 816 (1975) (Stevens, J., concurring)
(stating that the Commerce Clause does not "inhibit a State's power to experiment with different methods
of encouraging local industry"); Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 441 (1980) (dormant Commerce
Clause does not prohibit "effective and creative programs for solving local problems").
315. See KARST, supra note 24, at 77-79 (contending that "national community helps to provide a
sense of wholeness, not only for the society, but for the citizens' sense of self").
316. Harlan Stone, Fifty Years Work of the Supreme Court, 14 A.B.A. J. 428, 430 (1928).
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Commerce Clause decisions refers not simply to harmony among the several
state governments, but to bonds between their citizens.
When a state attempts to close its borders to needy Americans and refuses
to extend full membership rights to those who do establish state citizenship,
it rejects this concept of national community.1 7 The social theory reflected
by durational residence restrictions is, instead, an anachronism: "an outgrowth
of the centuries-old belief that everyone belongs to some locality and that no
district is under obligation to provide for those who do not belong."3"' This
notion of who does and who does not belong describes a concept of community
that tends strongly toward the static and parochial. The Constitution, by
contrast, sought above all to redefine our community on an evolving and
national basis. "For all the great purposes for which the federal government
was formed, we are one people, with one common country. We are all citizens
of the United States [and] members of the same community."319
The poor have long been branded as other and marginalized from social
and public life.32° Not only do we deny poor people the means to participate
in the community (or structure participation in ways that exclude those of a
poor person's means),321 we affirmatively isolate and vilify them, and there-
by reinforce an outcast status. 22 For a brief period in the 1960s, it appeared
317. As Justice Jackson put it, "[a]ny measure which would divide our citizenry on the basis of
property into one class free to move from state to state and another class that is poverty-bound to the place
where it has suffered misfortune" is inconsistent with the idea of "national citizenship" that largely defines
the national community. Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 185 (1941) (Jackson, J., concurring).
318. CLARKE, supra note 2, at 467-68.
319. The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 492 (1849) (Taney, C.J., dissenting).
320. See generally JOEL F. HANDLER & YEHESKEL HASENFELD, THE MORAL CONSTRUCTION OF
POVERTY (1991); Ross, supra note 93. At the founding of the Republic, states commonly restricted the
franchise to freeholders, so that the very poor, in common with slaves and women, had little or no voice
in the political life of the community. See Derrick Bell & Preeta Bansal, The Republican Revival and Racial
Politics, 97 YALE L.J. 1609, 1612 (1986). Of course, when a majority of Americans lived under economi-
cally "impoverished" circumstances-as was the case throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries-poverty did not differentiate its victims in ways that now lead to ostracization. See generally
KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE AFFLUENT SOCIETY (1969); MICHAEL HARRINGTON, THE OTHER AMERICA
(1962); GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 348-50 (1992). The present
day poor, however, not only have become a numerical minority, they are also now associated with racial
minorities and women, the two most prominent out-groups in America's history. See, e.g., Richard
Delgado, Pep Talks for the Poor: A Reply and Remonstrance on the Evils of Scapegoating 525 (1991);
Fineman, supra note 109; RUTH SIDEL, WOMEN AND CHILDREN LAST: THE PLIGHT OF POOR WOMEN
IN AFFLUENT AMERICA (1992); see also GREEN BOOK, supra note 2, at 1135 (noting that "blacks,
individuals in female-headed households, and Hispanics have poverty rates that greatly exceed the
average").
321. See Bell & Bansal, supra note 320, at 1612 ("civil participation" is viable only for those citizens
who enjoy "the luxury of material independence"); James C. Davies, The Development of the Individual
and the Development of Politics, in HUMAN NEEDS AND POLITICS 74 (R. Fitzgerald ed., 1977) (arguing
that individuals cannot participate in or defend themselves through politics unless and until their basic
human needs are met); cf. HANNAH ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION 29-31 (1958) (stating that in ancient
Greece the slaves could not be members of the polls because they lacked "the necessities of life").
322. See, e.g., Branfman et al., Measuring the Invisible Wall: Land Use Control and Residential
Patterns of the Poor, 82 YALE. L. J. 483 (1973); CHARLES M. HAAR & DANIEL W. FESSLER, THE WRONG
SIDE OF THE TRACKS (1986); CONCENTRATED URBAN POVERTY IN AMERICA (Michael G.H. McGeary
& Lawrence E. Lynn, Jr. eds., 1990); WILLIAM J. WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED (1987); Loic
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that the nation had renounced this course. The "Great Society" and its "War
on Poverty," though only halting responses to deep-seated problems, neverthe-
less reflected a gathering consensus that our best sense of national identity
compelled policies and programs that would facilitate the active integration of
poor people into the larger community. Justice Brennan's opinion for the Court
in Goldberg v. Kelly323 seemed to build upon that basic insight. Affording
extensive due process protections to welfare recipients, he asserted, not only
safeguards individual rights, but also promotes the "important governmental
interes[t]" of opening the national community more fully to the poor:
From its founding, the Nation's basic commitment has been to foster the dignity
and well-being of all persons within its borders. We have come to recognize that
forces not in the control of the poor contribute to their poverty ... Welfare, by
meeting the basic demands of subsistence, can help bring within the reach of the
poor the same opportunities that are available to others to participate meaningfully
in the life of the community ... Public assistance, then, is not mere charity, but
a means to "promote the general Welfare, and secure the blessings of Liberty to
ourselves and our Posterity."'
Twenty years later, American society has decisively retreated from this
nascent politics of inclusion. Not only has public policy broken faith with the
ideal of an inclusive community, but in the private sphere, the nation has
witnessed an acceleration of the secession of the elites3" and a more virulent
social and spatial segregation of the poor.326 The resurgence of durational
residence restrictions on welfare symbolizes this wider disintegration in the
nation's sense of community and shared public life. It casts aside the "ideal
of sympathy . . . [tihe sentiment that animates community. "327
J.D. Wacquant & William J. Wilson, The Cost of Racial and Class Exclusion in the Inner City, 501
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. Sci. 8, 11 (1989); see also KARST, supra note 24, at 125 ("Among
a 'people of plenty,' the poor are apt to be seen as deviants, as outsiders.") (citation omitted).
323. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
324. Id. at 264-65.
325. Robert B. Reich has explained the secession of the affluent as follows:
The secession is taking several forms. In many cities and towns, the wealthy have in effect
withdrawn their dollars from the support of public spaces and institutions shared by all and
dedicated the savings to their own private services. As public parks and playgrounds deteriorate,
there is a proliferation of private health clubs, golf clubs, tennis clubs, skating clubs and every
other type of recreational association in which costs are shared among members.
Robert B. Reich, Secession of the Successful, N.Y. TIMES MAO., Jan. 20, 1991, at 2; see also JOHN E.
CHUBB & TERRY M. MOE, PoLIrIcs, MARKETS AND AMERICA'S SCHOOLS (1990) (proposing market-based
approach to provision of educational services). See generally ALBERT 0. HIRsCHMAN, Exrr, VOICE AND
LOYALTY (1970).
326. See sources cited supra note 322.
327. See ROBERTO M. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS 220-22 (1977); see also Minersville Sch.
Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 596 (1940) ("[T]he ultimate foundation of a free society is the binding tie
of cohesive sentiment.").
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Throughout this country's history, the Commerce Clause has served as the
fundamental constitutional instrument for developing a more inclusive national
community and national identity. Its jurisgenerative potential ought to be
tapped again to advance a sense of community in which all are welcome
regardless of social or economic status. Testifying in support of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, Dean Erwin Griswold stated "It has been said long ago
that the Commerce Clause is the element that makes us a nation. This is
something on which we ought to be a nation, it seems to me. "32 We similar-
ly "ought to be a nation" in recognition that poverty is a deep national tragedy
that afflicts entire generations of our children and demands unified structural
solutions, not parochial, isolationist reactions.
328. Civil Rights-Public Accommodations, 1963: Hearing Before Senate Comm. on Commerce, 88th
Cong., 1st Sess., Part 2, 775-76 (1963) (statement of Erwin Griswold, Commissioner, Civil Rights
Commission).
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